Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 25 Volume XXV
Number 4 Volume XXV Book 4

Article 1

2015

The Enigma of Photography, Depiction, and Copyright Originality
Terry S. Kogan
University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Terry S. Kogan, The Enigma of Photography, Depiction, and Copyright Originality, 25 Fordham Intell. Prop.
Media & Ent. L.J. 869 (2015).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol25/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

The Enigma of Photography, Depiction,
and Copyright Originality
Terry S. Kogan*
Photography is an enigma. The features that distinguish it most
from other art forms—the camera’s automatism and the photograph’s
verisimilitude—have throughout its history also provided the basis for
critics to claim that a photographer is not an artist nor the photograph a
work of art. Because every photograph is the product of an automatic,
mechanical device, critics argue that a photographer is a mere technician
relegated to clicking a shutter button. Moreover, because every photograph displays an exact likeness of whatever happened to be sitting before
the camera, critics consider that image to be a factual document devoid of
creativity. Looking to the technology’s automatism and verisimilitude,
modern legal skeptics have joined this chorus by arguing that most photographs are inevitably uncreative facts—in the words of one scholar, the
“automated representation of reality”—and thereby undeserving of
copyright protection.
This is the first Article to propose that borrowing the concept of depiction from art theory can shed considerable light on photographic originality. As a depiction, a photograph has what philosopher Richard
Wollheim has described as “two folds.” The “first fold” refers to the
design markings on the surface of the photographic paper. The “second
fold” refers to the real world object or scene that a viewer perceives in
those design markings. This Article’s fundamental thesis is that, for
purposes of copyright law, a photograph’s originality inheres primarily
in a photographer’s creative choices that result in the placement of surface design markings. In contrast, the object or scene that a viewer sees in
a photograph rarely impacts the image’s originality. Accordingly, the
claim by legal skeptics that most photographs are uncreative facts locates
photographic originality in the wrong place—in the object or scene that a
viewer sees in the picture (depiction’s second fold). If, instead, a photo*
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graph’s originality depends primarily on a photographer’s creative
choices in placing surface design markings (depiction’s first fold), the
attack on originality based on automatism and verisimilitude—on a
photograph’s inevitably being an uncreative fact—collapses.
INTRODUCTION .............................................. 871
I. THE CULTURAL AND LEGAL ATTACKS ON
PHOTOGRAPHY’S ENIGMATIC FEATURES ......... 878
A. The Enigma of Photography and Cultural History...... 879
B. The Enigma of Photography in the Courts .................. 885
1. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony ........... 885
2. Post Burrow-Giles Cases—The Expansion of
Pre-Shutter Acts Relevant To Photographic
Originality........................................................ 895
3. Scholarly Skepticism Over Photographic
Originality........................................................ 900
II. DEPICTION AND COPYRIGHT ORIGINALITY ...... 902
A. The Concept of Depiction .......................................... 902
B. The Two Folds of Depiction and Copyright
Originality .............................................................. 905
1. The First Fold of Depiction—Photographic
Originality is Based Primarily on Choices
and Actions Related to Placing Design
Markings on a Picture’s Surface ...................... 906
2. The Second Fold of Depiction—The Object
or Scene Perceived By a Viewer in a
Photograph is Only Secondarily Related to
Copyright Originality ....................................... 910
III. THE ENIGMA OF PHOTOGRAPHY: THE
CAMERA’S
AUTOMATISM
AND
THE
PHOTOGRAPH’S VERISIMILITUDE DO NOT
UNDERMINE COPYRIGHT ORIGINALITY ...........915
A. Automatism—The Mechanics of the Camera Do
Not Defeat Copyright Originality ............................. 916
B. Verisimilitude—A Photograph Is Not a Fact.............. 920
1. Attacking a Photograph’s Copyrightability
Based on the Image’s Content Locates
Originality in the Wrong Place ......................... 923

2015]

THE ENIGMA OF PHOTOGRAPHY

871

2. A Photograph is Not Always More Truthful
Than a Painting ............................................... 924
3. Point-and-Shoot Photographs of Real World
Objects Can Possess Unique Aesthetic
Interest Worthy of Copyright Protection ......... 927
4. Photographic Accuracy Is a Creative Choice ....931
CONCLUSION ........................................................ 936
The camera, in all its manifestations, is our god, dispensing what we
mistakenly take to be truth. The photograph is the modern world.
Thomas Lawson, Last Exit: Painting1

INTRODUCTION
Photography is an enigma. The features that distinguish it most
from other art forms—the camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude—have throughout its history also provided
the basis for critics to claim that a photographer is not an artist nor
the photograph a work of art. From the moment that the Supreme
Court first considered photographic originality in the 1880s to the
present day, copyright law has been infected by the enigma of photography.
Every photograph is the product of an automatic device—the
camera. Unlike a painter whose every brushstroke is mediated
through her mental vision, critics cast a photographer as a mere
technician relegated to clicking a shutter button. Her creative intentions play little part in the appearance of the final image.2 Moreover, every photograph is infused with verisimilitude—perfect
truthfulness. Because that image inevitably displays an exact likeness of whatever happened to be sitting before the camera, critics
assert that a photograph merely records facts about the world and
1

Thomas Lawson, Last Exit: Painting, in ART AFTER MODERNISM: RETHINKING
REPRESENTATION 162 (Brian Wallis ed., 9th ed. 1999).
2
See discussion infra Part III.A; see also MARY WARNER MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY: A
CULTURAL HISTORY xiv (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY] (“The
camera seemed to have the unique ability to soak up large quantities of visual detail.
Therefore, its images were judged to be far less subjective than those made by other
methods.”).
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thereby lacks even the minimal creativity necessary to be considered an artwork.3
In fact, during the first decade after photography’s appearance
in 1839, these two features were the source not of denigration but
of high praise. Described by one of its pioneers as “impressed by
Nature’s hand,”4 “not a process invented by humans,”5 photography’s automatic nature captured the public’s imagination.6 Moreover, the image’s utter truthfulness led many to view the technology
as providing an externalized, ideal human vision.7 “[P]hotography
was said to be a wonder, a freak of nature, a new art, a threshold
science, and a dynamic instrument of democracy.”8
As photographs became commonplace after the mid-nineteenth
century, the public’s fascination with photography gave way to
more critical views.9 Though photography was establishing itself as
a powerful tool for scientists, critics attacked the camera’s automatism as cheapening the photographer’s relationship to nature,10
and considered the image’s verisimilitude to be “too truthful” to
be art.11
When in 1884, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,12 the
Supreme Court first considered whether the photographer could be
considered an Author and the photograph a Writing for purposes of
the Constitution’s Copyright Clause,13 the debate over photogra3

See discussion infra Part III.B.
W.H.F. TALBOT, THE PENCIL OF NATURE, Introductory Remarks 2 (Da Capo Press
ed., 1969); see also 2 SAMUEL F.B. MORSE, HIS LETTERS AND JOURNALS 144 (Edward Lind
Morse ed., 1914) (“Nature . . . has taken the pencil into her own hands, and she shows
that the minutest detail disturbs not the general repose.”).
5
MARY WARNER MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY AND ITS CRITICS—A CULTURAL HISTORY 3
(1997) [hereinafter MARIEN, CRITICS].
6
See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
7
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
8
MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 2.
9
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
10
MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 94.
11
Francis Frith, The Art of Photography, 5 ART J. 72 (1859), quoted in MARIEN,
PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 77.
12
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
13
The basis for granting copyright protection lies in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which grants Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
4
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phy’s art status had been raging for four decades. It was therefore
not surprising that, in appealing the lower court’s determination
that it had infringed on Napoleon Sarony’s copyright in a photograph of Oscar Wilde, Burrow-Giles attacked that image’s originality based on the camera’s mechanics and the photograph’s truthfulness.14
The story is now oft told of how in Burrow-Giles the Supreme
Court sidestepped these thorny issues by grounding photographic
originality in pre-shutter choices of the photographer related to
posing and staging the tableau.15 Over the past 125 years, courts
have expanded the range of a photographer’s pre-shutter choices
on which a photograph’s originality can be based.16 As a result,
courts now find that “[a]lmost any photograph ‘may claim the necessary originality to support a copyright.’”17
Nonetheless, contemporary legal scholars remain highly skeptical of photographic originality.18 Several argue that most phototheir respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See Burrow-Giles, 111
U.S. at 53, 55.
14
For example, Burrow-Giles argued that, because a photograph is the result of the
“chemical forces of light,” Statement and Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 15, Burrow-Giles,
111 U.S. 53 (No. 1071) [hereinafter Burrow-Giles’s Brief], the photographer contributes
“no intellectual labor,” only “mechanical skill.” Id. at 10. It further argued that a
“photograph . . . is always a reproduction true to nature,” id. at 21 (emphasis in original),
and therefore devoid of the creativity required for copyright protection; see also discussion
infra Part II.B.
15
See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the
Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 427 (2004) (“The Court located this
human trace in the pre-shutter activities.”); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s
Copyright—Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 356
(2011–2012); Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and
Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1499 (2011).
16
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Elements of originality
in a photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and
camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant involved.”); see also
discussion infra Part II.B.2.
17
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E][1]
(Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed.)).
18
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 374 (“[A] large percentage of the world’s
photographs are likely not protected by American copyright law because the images lack
even a modicum of creativity ….”); Kathleen Connolly Butler, Keeping the World Safe
from Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refrigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art Images in the Public
Domain Through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital Reproductions, 21 HASTINGS COMM.
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graphs run afoul of the fundamental axiom that copyright law protects only creative expression, not facts or ideas.19 Not surprisingly,
this attack is based squarely on the enigmatic features of the technology, the camera’s automatism and the image’s verisimilitude.
For example, viewing a photograph as the “automated representation of reality,”20 Professor Justin Hughes asserts that, as “information-laden nature of photographs”21 and “simple conveyors of
truth,”22 most photographs are uncreative facts not entitled to
copyright protection.23
This Article proposes that introducing the concept of depiction
from art theory into copyright law can cast significant light on photographic originality and help to make sense of the roles that the
camera’s mechanics and the image’s veracity play in the law’s
treatment of photography. 24
To depict an object is to represent the object visually, to give
meaning to the object through a picture.25 In this Article, I rely
upon the “seeing-in” approach to depiction introduced by philosopher Richard Wollheim,26 the approach that dominates the work
& ENT. L.J. 55, 103–14 (1998); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection
and Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1594–1600 (1963); Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853,
898–904 (2004); Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 818–19 (2010); Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 456–57 (2009).
19
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 381 (“[I]t seems that the claim that many—
perhaps most—of the world’s photographs are completely unprotected by copyright
arises simply because ‘[i]n most uses of the camera, the photograph’s naive or descriptive
function is paramount.’”) (quoting SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPHY 132–33 (1977));
Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV.
683, 714–16 (2012).
20
Hughes, supra note 15, at 343.
21
Id. at 349.
22
Id. at 344.
23
See id. at 398; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
24
The concept of depiction is absent from the Copyright Act of 1976. The word
depiction appears twice in Section 106A(c)(3) of the Visual Artist’s Rights Act of 1991, 17
U.S.C. § 106A et seq., in a context unrelated to originality.
25
See, e.g., PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DEPICTION 1 (Catharine Abell & Katerina
Bantinaki eds., 2010) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES]; see discussion infra
Part II.A.
26
See, e.g., RICHARD WOLLHEIM, Seeing-As, Seeing-In, and Pictorial Representation, in
ART AND ITS OBJECTS 205, 213–14 (2d ed. 1980) (introducing the “twofold thesis”).
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of contemporary art scholars. Wollheim argues that what is unique
to pictures as representations is that they cause a viewer to have a
“twofold” visual experience: the viewer perceives design markings
on the surface of the picture (the “first fold”) and, at the same
time, perceives a real world object or scene in those design markings (the “second fold”).27
The arguments presented herein flow from a simple observation: a photograph of a real world object or scene is a depiction and,
as such, has two folds. The first fold consists of the design markings on the surface of the photographic paper. The second fold
consists of the object or scene that a viewer perceives in those design markings.
Introducing the concept of depiction into copyright law can offer important insights into photographic originality. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,28 the Supreme Court set
forth two criteria for originality: “[T]he work [must have been] independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and . . . it [must] possess[] at least some minimal degree
of creativity.”29
The fundamental thesis of this Article is that in the realm of the
graphic arts—painting, etching, photography, etc.—the requisite
minimal degree of creativity is based primarily on an artist’s choic27

Katerina Bantinaki, Picture Perception as Twofold Experience, in PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, at 128 (“The notion of twofoldness has been one of Richard
Wollheim’s important contributions to the study of depiction. By means of this notion
Wollheim aimed to highlight the fact that in seeing a picture the viewer can be visually
aware of both the object that is being depicted and the medium in a single perceptual
act.”)
28
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
29
Id. at 345. I will refer to Feist’s requirements as the “non-copying” criterion and the
“minimal creativity” criterion. What I refer to as the “non-copying” criterion has been
referred to by others as the “independent creation” criterion. See, e.g., Justin Hughes,
The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 81, 99–100 (1998). Some commentators collapse the two requirements. See, e.g.,
Hughes, supra note 15, at 340 n.3 (“Strictly speaking, under current U.S. doctrine,
‘[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement’ for copyright protection and ‘originality
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.’ . . . I use the two
interchangeably. Assuming that ‘independent creation’ will not occur without
‘creativity,’ establishing creativity establishes originality.” (quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at
346)). Contra Hughes, I argue that it is critical to consider these two requirements to be
independent of one another. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
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es and actions that result in design markings being placed on the
surface of the work, the first fold of depiction. Thus, a painting’s
originality inheres primarily in the painter’s choices that result in
brushstrokes being arrayed on the canvas’ surface. Similarly, a photograph’s originality inheres primarily in the photographer’s choices that result in design markings being arrayed on the surface of the
photographic paper (or pixels on a computer screen).30
What is the relevance of the second fold of depiction—the object that a viewer perceives in a picture—to photographic originality? Assuming that her choices in placing surface design markings do
satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity criterion,31 the photographer’s
choice of an object or scene to photograph can, on occasion, either
enhance or defeat originality.
In instances in which a photographer also poses or stages the
subject matter that is to appear in the picture, such acts enhance
the level of creativity she infuses into the picture. Thus, prearranging a still life or posing a person for a photograph can enhance minimal creativity for purposes of Feist.32
Nonetheless, irrespective of how creative the choices related to
placing surface design markings, if a photographer copies another
work, the picture will run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion.
Thus, it is doubtful that postmodern artist Sherrie Levine’s renowned and extremely valuable photographs that merely rephotographed images of depression-era photographer Walker
Evans are original under Feist.33
Understanding photographic originality in this way helps to clarify the relationship between the enigmatic features of photography
and copyright law. Given the primacy of choices concerning the
placement of surface design markings, the major challenge to pho30

These decisions include, among others, choosing a particular camera and film,
adjusting the camera’s settings, adjusting artificial lighting and shadows, and choosing an
angle from which to shoot the picture. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
31
Unless minimal creativity is established with respect to the first fold of depiction, no
visual image (photographic or otherwise) can be original. Thus, photographs taken
randomly by a drone flying over the Alps, despite their beauty, would in all likelihood not
satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity criterion because there is no “personality” infused into
the image.
32
See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
33
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
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tographic originality is the camera’s automatism. Do the mechanics
of that device so constrict the range of a photographer’s choices
with respect to marking the image’s surface that most photographs
are inherently unoriginal?34 Recent scholarship by philosophers of
photography suggests that attacks on the art status of the photograph based on automatism are somewhat confused and significantly overstated.35
In great contrast, I will argue that the recent assault by legal
scholars on photographic originality based on verisimilitude—the
photograph’s being a “fact” in the world—is fundamentally misconceived. A photograph of an object or scene is no more a fact in
the world than is a painting of that same object or scene. This misconception results from the failure to understand where to locate
photographic originality.
Attacks based on the photograph’s truthfulness assume that
the object or scene that a viewer perceives in the image—
depiction’s second fold—plays a major role in determining the image’s originality. But this is rarely the case. If a photograph is original, it is because the photographer’s choices in placing surface design markings meet Feist’s minimal creativity standard. A photograph of the Grand Canyon is no more a fact in the world than a
realistic painting of the Grand Canyon is a fact in the world. Rather,
both are pictures composed of surface design markings that depict
objects and scenes in the real world.
Part I explores the conflicting social and legal reactions to photography from the moment of its appearance in the late 1830s. I
first examine the cultural debate that revolved around the enigmatic features of the technology—the camera’s automatism and the
photograph’s verisimilitude.36 I then explore how this debate entered the courthouse when the Supreme Court first considered
34

See discussion infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Diarmuid Costello & Margaret Iversen, Introduction: Photography Between
Art History and Philosophy, 38 CRITICAL INQUIRY 679, 685 (2012) (“By now, nearly all
philosophers have rejected the claim that their underlying assumptions about
photography preclude the possibility of fully fledged photographic art. Nonetheless,
dominant conceptions of photography as an automatic recording mechanism within
philosophy arguably still face difficulties doing full justice to artistic uses of the
medium.”). See generally infra note 206.
36
See discussion infra Part I.A.
35
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photographic originality in Burrow-Giles, and the aftermath of that
decision on later courts’ treatment of photography.37 Part I concludes by introducing the ongoing skepticism that contemporary
scholars harbor toward photographic originality, a skepticism based
on the enigmatic features of photography.38
Part II turns to art theory, introduces the philosophical concept
of depiction, and explores Wollheim’s proposal that every representational picture has two folds.39 I then apply the insights drawn
from art theory to understanding photographic originality.40
Part III explores in greater depth the challenge of contemporary
legal scholars to photographic originality based on the camera’s
automatism41 and the image’s verisimilitude.42 I conclude that photography survives both challenges and, accordingly, courts are correct in their assumption that “[a]lmost any photograph ‘may claim
the necessary originality to support a copyright.’” 43
I. THE CULTURAL AND LEGAL ATTACKS ON
PHOTOGRAPHY’S ENIGMATIC FEATURES
From the moment of its appearance in the 1830s, two features
of photography have been at the vortex of both cultural and legal
debates over whether or not the technology is an art form or mere
information:
1. The Camera’s Automatism—The photograph is the product
of a mechanical device, the camera. In contrast to a painter whose
every brushstroke is mediated through a mental vision, a photographer seems a mere technician relegated to clicking a shutter button. Her creative intentions seem to play virtually no role in the
appearance of the image.44
37

See discussion infra Part I.B.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
39
See discussion infra Part II.A.
40
See discussion infra Part II.B.
41
See discussion infra Part III.A.
42
See discussion infra Part III.B.
43
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co, 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal
citations omitted).
44
See Diarmuid Costello & Dominic McIver Lopes, Introduction, 70 J. OF AESTHETICS
& ART CRITICISM 1 (2012). (“At the core of the classic arguments in the philosophy of
38
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2. The Photograph’s Verisimilitude—In the words of nineteenth century photographer Henry Peach Robinson, every photograph appears to display “the absolute reproduction of some scene
or person that has appeared before the camera.”45
Throughout its history, these two features of photography have
confounded critics, providing grounds for both high praise and bitter condemnation.46 The fact that the same features of the technology have fueled such conflicting reactions is the basis for what I
term “the enigma of photography.” This contest of understandings moved into the courtroom in the late nineteenth century.
A. The Enigma of Photography and Cultural History
During the first decade after photography’s disclosure in
1839,47 the public responded to the new technology with utter
wonderment, many considering the photograph to be miraculous
and magical.48 Seen as having great potential for both science and
photography is the belief, expressed in a variety of ways, that photography is special
because it is at bottom an automatic recording mechanism that ensures that what one sees
in a photograph is causally determined by the photographed scene, rather than
intentionally determined by the photographer.”).
45
HENRY PEACH ROBINSON, PICTURE-MAKING BY PHOTOGRAPHY 114 (1884).
46
The camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude are often seen as
working in tandem. See, e.g., Diarmuid Costello & Dawn M. Phillips, Automatism,
Causality and Realism: Foundational Problems in the Philosophy of Photography, 4 PHIL.
COMPASS 1, 2 (2009) (“The realism of photographs, in some sense, depends on the
automatism of the photographic process.”). A third feature of photography, its infinite
reproducibility, has also been the subject of both praise and scorn. See, e.g., WALTER
BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second Version, in
THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF ITS TECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY, AND OTHER
WRITINGS ON MEDIA 19, 20–22 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott et al.
trans., 2008). The earliest photographs, however, were not reproducible and the
technology to reproduce photographs did not come about until the 1850s. See MARIEN,
CRITICS, supra note 5, at 42 (“The discourse in photography’s early years was so focused
on the medium’s originality that it tended to exclude discussion of photography’s
capacity to produce multiple copies.”).
47
Because many people claim to have invented photography, Mary Warner Marien
refers to the year 1839 as the year of photography’s disclosure, not discovery. See MARIEN,
PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 1; see also MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 2
(“[P]hotography’s origins had not one story but many conflicting stories. . . . Today,
these contradictions continue to pack its history or, one should say, its histories.”).
48
See MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 1–2 (“Those who witnessed the advent of
photography in 1839 discussed its debut in the language of exceptions. Long before it
could effect significant social change, photography was confidently described as a
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art,49 photography was referred to an “art-science,”50 a label that
survived into the 1850s. “The term recognized that photographic
images were not only generated by a mix of science and art, but also
applied in both activities,”51 Mary Warner Marien explains,
“[e]specially in the early years … photography was flexible and experimental, neither a sharply delimited art form nor only the province of science and technology.”52
Much of the early excitement over photography hovered
around the two distinctive features of the new technology, the
camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude.
The automatic nature of the camera captured the public’s imagination, in part because of a mythos promoted by the technolotransformational technology.”). Edgar Allen Poe described the new technology as
“miraculous beauty.” Edgar Allen Poe, The Daguerreotype, ALEXANDER’S WEEKLY
MESSENGER (Jan. 15, 1840), cited in MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 12 (“Even
commentators who knew exactly how photography worked wrote about it as a wonder.”)
49
In his 1839 essay, William Henry Fox Talbot “conceived the photographic image as
a kind of ‘natural magic’ with potential for science and art.” MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY,
supra note 2, at 28 (quoting William Henry Fox Talbot, Some Account of the Art of
Photogenic Drawing, or the Process by which Natural Objects May Be Made to Delineate
Themselves without the Aid of the Artist’s Pencil (1839)).
50
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 23–24; see also id. at 71 (“In the first years
after photography’s presentation to the world … the medium was not sharply defined as
either art or science, but frequently termed an art-science.”); id. at 24 (“The ambiguous
character of photography in its early years was fostered by the equally uncertain
definitions of art and science. Art could mean a skill or a craft, as well as specific media
such as painting, sculpture, and engraving. Science referred to areas of knowledge such as
biology and geology, and also to techniques for making experiences and observations,
such as objective scrutiny and recording.”). In fact, many early photographers viewed
themselves as artists. Id. at 85 (stating that French photographer Nadar “maintained that
he was not a simple operator of photographic equipment but an artist, sensitive to the
nuances of personal character as well as rules of composition”).
51
Id. at 23–24.
52
Id. at 23. Mary Warner Marien’s cultural histories of photography cast doubt on the
assertions of legal scholars that, early in its history, photography was not considered to be
an art form. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 351 (“The very characteristics that made
the photograph seem like ‘truth itself’ initially made photography seem to be only a
technology and outside the realm of artistic works, both to artists and to mid-nineteenth
century minds conversant with copyright.”); see also Farley, supra note 15, at 397
(“Initially, photographers made no claims to be artists. Photographers stressed the
mechanical nature of the process. The opportunities and possibilities that the camera
presented for artistic creation were absent from the discourse. Even artists who took up
photography had trouble articulating the value of creative, as opposed to documentary,
photography.”)
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gy’s pioneers, Louis Daguerre, William Henry Fox Talbot, and Joseph Nicephonre Niépce.53 Despite the fact that early photographs
required “lengthy preparation of materials prior to exposure . . .
and a cumbersome development process,”54 these individuals
“shied away from explaining photography as an invention that
makes images through human agency. Each insisted that photography originated in nature and was disclosed by nature.”55 Talbot
explained that the image was “impressed by Nature’s hand.”56
Niépce described his image as “spontaneous reproduction, by the
action of light.”57 Stressing its apparent spontaneity, the pioneers
referred to the new technology as “‘auto-graphy,’ . . . nature’s automatic writing.”58
Coupled with the public’s amazement over the technology’s
automatism was excitement over the photograph’s verisimilitude—its inherent truthfulness. Viewing the photograph as nature’s product easily transmuted into viewing it as neutral vision—
an externalized, ideal human vision59 that offered transparent
knowledge,60 an objective view of the world.61 The photograph was
a “replica of original experience”62 and an “infallible representa-

53

See MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 72.
Id. at 40.
55
Id. at 72.
56
MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 3 (citing W.H.F. TALBOT, supra note 4); see also
MORSE, supra note 4, at 144 (“Nature . . . has taken the pencil into her own hands . . . .”).
57
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 72–73 (quoting MARIEN, CRITICS, supra
note 5, at 3 (internal citations omitted)).
58
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 73.
59
MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 5–6.
60
Id. at 7.
61
In 1840, Edgar Allen Poe noted that “all language must fall short of conveying any
just idea of the truth . . . but the closest scrutiny of the photogenic drawing discloses only
a more absolute truth, a more perfect identity of aspect with the thing represented.” He
further noted that photography was a “positively perfect mirror” that “is infinitely more
accurate in its representation than any painting by human hands.” MARIEN,
PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 26 (quoting Edgar Allen Poe, The Daguerreotype,
ALEXANDER’S WEEKLY MESSENGER (Jan. 15, 1840), available at http://www.eapoe.org
/works/misc/dgtypea.htm).
62
MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 40.
54
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tion”63 that surpassed any previous form of handmade iconography.64
The cultural excitement that marked photography’s first decade soon gave way to a more critical view: “[W]ith the continued
spread of photography, the development of new applications, and
the intense commercialization of the medium in the late 1850s,
amazement at its ability to capture appearances declined. As photography became more commonplace, the medium’s societal and
artistic impact was more frequently debated.”65
The early wonderment over photography transformed after
mid-century into concern over its debasing effects on mass culture:
“By 1850 photography was immersed in societal debates and deeply at odds with itself. It was conjectured to be variously an art, a
danger to art, a science, a revolutionary means of education, a
mindless machine for rendering, and a threat to social order.”66
This debate was often shrouded in a narrower debate over whether
photography should or should not be considered an art form.67
63

Id.
The photograph’s surface appearance contributed to the perception that the image
captured perfect truth:
Unlike painting and engraving, photography left relatively few visible
traces of its manufacture. Compared with brushstrokes and a network
of lines, the daguerreotype seemed like a smooth mirror that did not
betray how it was made. As a result, the photograph was seen as an
automatic recording device that required no interpretation.
Increasingly the photograph was believed to be what the average
person would have seen standing in the same spot at the same time as
the photographer.… The fact that photographers … manipulated and
retouched negatives did not significantly affect the public’s belief in
photographic truth.
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 69.
65
Id. at 75; see also id. at 139 (“[The] proliferation of photographs proved to be a mixed
blessing; seeing many images eventually reduced the impact of each of them.…”).
66
Id. at xiii.
67
See, e.g., id. at 95 (“As photography lost its novelty, it gained both adherents and
detractors, and they often focused on the relationship of photography to art and culture.
On the one hand, the medium was the most exact way of creating art reproductions that
could be viewed by more people than could travel to see the originals. . . . On the other
hand, critics were quick to point out that the passion for optical exactitude suppressed the
public’s appreciation for nuance and opportunities for quiet rumination on images. The
transcription of visual appearances, however adeptly rendered, did not seem capable of
conveying higher sentiments and moral example.”)
64
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No surprise, attacks on photography focused on the technology’s verisimilitude and automatism. Mary Warner Marien observes
that “photographic verisimilitude became a bludgeon in the hands
of photograph’s critics.”68 In deriding the objectivity of the image,
in 1859 art critic Francis Frith described photography as “too
truthful. It insists upon giving us ‘the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth.’ Now, we want, in Art, the first and the last
of these conditions, but we can dispense very well with the middle
term.”69 Critics feared that the photograph’s “intractable verisimilitude”70 could not express the personality and soul of the artist
and would deaden the imagination.71 Art critic John Ruskin is said
to have expressed concern that the growing use of photographs
“implied the substitution of vulgar verisimilitude for higher
truths.”72
Concern over the photograph’s truthfulness was intermixed
with concern over the camera’s automatism. Some believed that
“[p]hotography’s apparent automatism simultaneously cheapened
the photographer’s relationship to nature and to the traditions of
fine art.… The ease of photography took away its characterbuilding challenge.”73 Others believed the new technology’s “automatism threatened to make the public weary of the work required
in art making and to instigate a chic indifference to painstakingly
acquired human skill.”74 In the view of critics, the camera was yet
another machine that “tamped down human imagination, replacing
creativity, observations and insight with mediocre readymade
goods.”75
Stung by these attacks, professional photographers sought to
create a divide between the burgeoning availability of low-priced
68

Id. at 73.
Frith, supra note 11, at 72, quoted in MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 77.
70
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 73.
71
See, e.g., NAOMI ROSENBLUM, A WORLD HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 210 (4th ed.
2007) (internal citations omitted) (arguing that critics derided photography, declaring
that the new medium “‘copies everything and explains nothing, it is blind to the realm of
the spirit’”).
72
MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 107.
73
Id. at 94.
74
Id. at 59.
75
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 159.
69
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photographs and the realm of “High Art” photography, deemed to
have the potential to elevate public morality.76 Other photographers, known as Pictorialists, counteracted the attack on photographic objectivity by encouraging photographers to render their subjects
slightly out of focus.77
At the same time, supporters of the new technology saw great
potential in the truthfulness of the photograph to further the
progress of science. “Photographic realism, so extensively employed as an indicator of cultural decline during photography’s early decades, was redrafted in the 1880s in scientific, not artistic,
terms.”78 Moreover, many considered photography’s power to
create exact art reproductions to be an educational tool that could
introduce fine arts to the masses.79
Unfortunately, as the nineteenth century progressed, the early
view that photography could be both an art and a science diminished.80 Rather, the late-century contest over the status of photography as art form or mere information took on a broader significance:
For better or worse, [photography] was associated
with the technological changes sustained by an urban middle-class society. As a new kind of verisimilitude, not quite a copy, not quite an actuality, photography defined modern vicarious experience. It
teetered between authenticity and artificiality,
knowledge and deceit. As both an idea and an imaging system, photography enhanced the tension between art conceived as the secular agency of truth

76

Id. at 75.
Id. at 170; see infra note 270 and accompanying text.
78
MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 142.
79
See id. at 68, 114; see also id. at 124 (“The photographic reproduction of art treasures
promised to transmit aristocratic high culture to the lesser classes.”).
80
See, e.g., MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 159 (“As photography emerged as
scientific and social evidence, it was also increasingly labeled counterfeit in art. The link
between art and science in the popular phrase “the art-science of photography”
weakened. In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the early years of the
twentieth century, art and science would be painstakingly disconnected.”).
77
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and art conceived as the mirror of transient effects
in nature and in society.81
This contest of meanings would enter the courtroom in the
1880s when the Supreme Court first considered the issue of photographic originality in Burrow-Giles.
B. The Enigma of Photography in the Courts
1. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony
When Burrow-Giles came before the Supreme Court in 1884,82
the cultural debate over the photograph’s status as an artwork or
mere information had been waging for several decades. The litigants brought this debate into the courthouse and, in so doing,
challenged the Court to grapple with the camera’s automatism and
the photograph’s verisimilitude.
In that case, Napoleon Sarony, a well-known New York City
portrait photographer, alleged that Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
infringed on his copyright in a photograph of Oscar Wilde by making 85,000 unauthorized reproductions of the picture.83 Underlying
these allegations lay the momentous question of whether the Constitution permitted Congress to extend copyright protection to
photographs in its Act of 1865.84 The answer turned on whether,
under the Copyright Clause,85 a photographer could be considered
an “Author” and a photograph a “Writing.”86
81

MARIEN, CRITICS, supra note 5, at 111.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
83
Id. at 54.
84
See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1865, 38th Cong.,
2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198 (“[The Act’s provisions] shall extend to and include photographs
and the negatives thereof … and shall ensure to the benefit of authors … in the same
manner, and to the same extent, and upon the same conditions as to the authors of prints
and engravings.”); CONG. GLOBE 981 (Feb. 22, 1865).
85
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power “to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, §8, cl. 8. To implement that provision, Congress enacted the first Copyright Act in
1790, followed by major revisions in 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), 35 Stat.
1175, and in 1976, Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
86
The lower court avoided both issues entirely by relying on the presumption of
constitutionality afforded to acts of Congress. See Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic
82
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In determining that a photograph could be deemed a Writing,
the Court rejected Burrow-Giles’s contention that the Constitution
limited that term to books.87 Noting that Congress had extended
copyright protection to “maps, charts, designs, engravings, etchings, cuts and other prints,”88 the Court concluded,
it is difficult to see why congress cannot make [photographs] the subject of copyright as well as the others. . . . The only reason why photographs were not
included in the extended list in the act of 1802 is,
probably, that they did not exist, as photography, as
an art, was then unknown . . . .89
In determining whether a photographer could be considered an
Author, the court reached two conclusions. First, it established a
broad originality requirement for copyright law, defining an “author” as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker.”90 Turning to photography, the Court also concluded: “We
entertain no doubt that the constitution is broad enough to cover an
act authorizing copyright of photographs, so far as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.”91
Accordingly, it was incumbent on the Court to explain exactly
how photographs are the “original intellectual conceptions”92 of a
photographer. Its solution to photographic originality was to
ground authorship in the photographer’s pre-shutter acts related to
Co., 17 F. 591, 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883). On appeal, the Supreme Court also considered
whether Sarony had placed adequate notice of copyright on his photograph, an issue the
court dispensed with in a brief paragraph:
[I]t is enough to say that the object of the statute is to give notice of
the copyright to the publish by placing upon each copy, in some
visible shape the name the author, the existence of the claim of
exclusive right, and the date at which this right was objected. This
notice is sufficiently given by the words ‘Copyright, 1882, by N.
Sarony’ found on each copy of the photograph.”
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55.
87
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 57–58.
90
Id. at 58. Modern courts look to this determination in Burrow-Giles as “the
touchstone of copyright protection today.” See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991).
91
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
92
Id.
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posing or staging the tableau to be photographed.93 At the same
time, the court suggested that less artful images—“the ordinary
production of a photograph”94—that were “the mere mechanical
reproduction of the physical features or outlines or some object”95
might not be protected by copyright law. On that issue, the court
stated, “[W]e decide nothing.”96 Nonetheless, that non-decision
established a distinction between two types of photographs—an
“original work of art,”97 on the one hand, and those deemed “ordinary,” on the other.
But there’s a white elephant in the midst of the Supreme
Court’s Burrow-Giles decision. The paragraph that sets forth the
Supreme Court’s solution to photographic originality98—described
by one commentator as “remarkable”99—is taken virtually verbatim from Napoleon Sarony’s Complaint.100 Moreover, the likely
93

In concluding that Sarony had proven “the existence of those facts of originality, of
intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the part of the author,” id. at 59–
60, the Court relied upon the lower court’s finding:
[I]n regard to the photograph in question, that it is a “useful, new,
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that plaintiff
made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental conception,
to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front
of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and
other various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so
as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and
shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression, and from such
disposition, arrangement, or representation, made entirely by
plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.” These findings, we think,
show this photograph to be an original work of art, the product of
plaintiff’s intellectual invention, of which plaintiff is the author, and
of a class of inventions for which the constitution intended that
congress should secure to him the exclusive right to use, publish, and
sell, as it has done by section 4952 of the Revised Statutes.
Id. at 60 (quoting Findings of the Circuit Court ¶ 3, in Transcript of Record at 14, BurrowGiles, 111 U.S. at 53 (No. 1071) [hereinafter Transcript]).
94
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 60.
98
See supra note 93.
99
Farley, supra note 15, at 425.
100
Two separate paragraphs in Sarony’s Complaint state:
And this plaintiff further says that the said photograph, the title of
which is “Oscar Wilde, No. 18,” and which is the subject of this suit,
is a new, useful, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and
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inspiration for the Court’s distinction between art photographs and
ordinary photographs can be found in Sarony’s Brief.101 Accordingly, what is remarkable is that no scholar has yet to focus on the parties’ briefs as a way to gain deep insight into the Supreme Court’s
decision.102 I will venture the bold claim that Sarony’s Brief, heretofore virtually ignored by scholars, offers insights into photographic originality that are as important as the Supreme Court’s BurrowGiles decision itself. I turn to the parties’ briefs.
Given the controversy over photography whirling outside of the
courthouse, it is unsurprising that Burrow-Giles’s Brief invites the
Supreme Court to become directly embroiled in the debate over
the camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude. The
genius of Sarony’s responsive brief was to suggest a way for the
court to sidestep that debate, a suggestion the court embraced with
open arms.
Burrow-Giles’s Brief is structured around two constitutional
questions: “Are Photographers ‘Authors?’”103 and “Are Photothat the same is the original invention and design of this plaintiff, for
the reason that it was made by this plaintiff entirely from his own
mental conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said
Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the
costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph,
arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and
disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by this plaintiff, producing the picture
which is the subject of this suit; and that the terms “author,”
“inventor,” “designer,” as used in this complaint and in the art of
photography mean the person who so produces the photograph.
See Complaint, in Transcript, supra note 93, at 4, 6–7. This paragraph from Sarony’s
Complaint is quoted virtually verbatim in the findings of the trial court. See Findings of
the Circuit Court ¶ 3, in Transcript, supra note 93, at 14. Sarony also adopts the language
from his Complaint in his Brief filed in the Supreme Court. See Brief on the Part of the
Defendant in Error at 11–12, Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 53 (No. 1071) [hereinafter Sarony’s
Brief].
101
See Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 12–14.
102
Two scholars have recognized that the Court’s critical language has its origin in
Sarony’s filings. See Farley, supra note 15, at 411 n.92 (“Although the Court states that
this quote is from the lower court’s findings of fact, this language is also in Sarony’s
brief.”); Subotnik, supra note 15, at 1500, n.52 (“Professor Farley identifies Sarony’s
brief as the source of the language. In fact, the origin of the language can be traced back
further still, nearly word for word, to Sarony’s complaint in the lower court.”).
103
Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 9.
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graphs ‘Writings?’”104 To answer both questions, Burrow-Giles
sets out its basic legal premise: “To obtain a copyright upon any
article whatever, the party claiming this protection must be the author of the visible article on which the copyright is granted. That is to
say, that he must be the person through whose intellectual labor the
article we see is produced.105
Burrow-Giles asks, “Does [the Photographer] apply his own intellectual labor to the materials of his composition?”106 The answer
is no: “[I]n photography no intellectual and original labor is required.”107
To support this assertion, Burrow-Giles first attacks the technology’s automatism. In so doing, it borrows the very tropes that
photography’s pioneers used to describe the new technology—
photographs are the products of nature and light, not of human
hands.108 Burrow-Giles argues that the “camera[] act[s] by
109
UNCHANGEABLE LAWS OF NATURE,”
and the image results from
the “chemical forces of light on prepared plates.”110 Accordingly,
“the true author is the sun—not the photographer.”111 “The light
and shade in any picture varies with every painter, his own mental
originality determining the same; but in the case of a photographer
the lights and shades are beyond his power; his camera will reflect
only the effect of the sunlight on the scene.”112
Burrow-Giles then attacks the photograph’s verisimilitude as
undermining originality. A photograph is “but an absolute repro-

104

Id. at 17.
Id. at 12. Burrow-Giles looks to a painter as an example of a person who invests such
labor into his product: “[T]he painter’s mind is actively engaged; the choice of the
correct colors, the mixture of colors, the correct light and shade, the drawing of the
outlines—all are acts of an intellectual kind, and it is his work which transforms the blank
canvas into a thing of beauty.” Id. at 14.
106
Id. at 10.
107
Id.
108
See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
109
Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 16.
110
Id. at 10; id. at 19 (The photograph “is solely the work of the chemical forces of light;
no brain work is required, no originality, no creative power of the mind.”).
111
Id. at 8; see also id. (“If it is true that, ‘AFTER ALL, IT WAS THE SUN WHICH DREW THE
PICTURE,’ then the sun alone is the author of the [photograph].…”).
112
Id. at 16.
105
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duction of something already extant, without change of any kind.”113
Elsewhere it asserts: “[T]he very object of photography is to
represent truthfully an object already extant, without any deviation
at all from the subject. . . .THE BETTER THE PHOTOGRAPH, THE
TRUER IS THE LIKENESS; THE LESS IS THE ORIGINALITY OF THE
114
DESIGN.”
In its attack on photographic originality, Burrow-Giles’s Brief
often intermixes arguments based on automatism with arguments
based on verisimilitude: “A photograph, surely, is the reproduction by
natural means of something already existing.… A photograph … is
always a reproduction true to nature—a variation from the original
is impossible by the very laws of nature which govern its production.”115 “[T]he camera, acting by UNCHANGEABLE LAWS OF
NATURE, represents the scene AS IT IS; nothing is added, nothing
omitted.”116
In responding to Burrow-Giles’s Brief, Napoleon Sarony’s
challenge was clear-cut. The protagonists in Burrow-Giles’s drama
were Nature, the Sun, and the Camera, none of which qualify as an
“Author.” Moreover, the product of these non-authors is a photograph that, as a mechanical copy of reality, is not a creative “Writing.”
In crafting his argument, Sarony’s goal was twofold. First, he
had to reinstate the photographer at center stage as an Author who
exercised “his own intellectual labor.”117 Second, he had to deflect
attention away from the automatic, mechanical nature of the camera and the imitative nature of the photograph. Burrow-Giles had
attempted to draw a clear distinction between photography and
other arts. Sarony needed to counter this by aligning photography
with arts indisputably protected by copyright law.
113

Id. at 20.
Id. at 18; see also id. at 21 (“The very essence of photography denies the possibility of
fancy or imagination—truthful representation of existing objects is what it aims at. No
genius and no laborious thought is required; nothing but mechanical skill.”).
115
Id. at 21.
116
Id. at 16; see also id. at 11 (“[T]he true object sought after is a truthful representation
of the subject.”); id. at 5 (“That photographs and negatives are not original works of art,
but reproductions of existing objects by application of physical laws, has been recognized
by the Courts.”).
117
Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 10.
114
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Accordingly, Sarony’s Brief sets forth two critical premises.
The first is that copyright law sets out to protect an artist’s mental
conception, but this can only be accomplished indirectly by protecting the “materialization” of that conception: “It is evident that
what the law really seeks to protect is the ideal invention or creation
of the mind, but as it is not practicable to give protection to that directly, the protection is given indirectly to certain materializations,
or conventional and intelligible expressions thereof . . . .”118
The second premise—and the more important for Sarony—is
that the particular form in which an artist “expresses, manifests, or
discovers”119 that materialization of his mental creation is not important, assuming that it is within the statutory subject matter of
copyright law:120
[T]he conceptions, inventions and creations of the
mind may be manifested, expressed, or discovered
in many ways and according to various arts. Every
art has its own peculiar methods and forms of such
expressions, manifestation or discovery …. For the
purpose of securing the right, the particular form of
manifesting, expressing or discovering is not important, if it is one of those which the Legislature has
seen proper to provide for ….121
The thrust of his strategy is clear. The artist and his mental
creation—whether painter, etcher, engraver or photographer—are
brought front and center. A photographer is no different from any
other artist in having such a mental creation, and it is the primary
goal of copyright law to protect that creation.
It is “not important,” however, how that mental creation is
“manifested,” whether in a painting, a sculpture, an engraving or a
photograph. Sarony proposes a broad non-discrimination principle
118

Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 6–7; see also id. at 13 (“[O]f necessity the law can
only attach protection to the material thing which discovers, fixes, makes permanent, or
serves as a vehicle of communicating that ideal.”).
119
Id. at 11.
120
A photograph was within the statutory subject matter of copyright law by reason of
Congress’ Act of 1865. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540; see also Act of Mar.
3, 1865, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 Stat. 198.
121
Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 9–10 (emphasis supplied).
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with respect to how a particular art form “expresses, manifests, or
discovers” the artist’s mental creation:
The painter cannot claim that the sculptor is not an
author, inventor or designer because he does not
discover his invention by means of color; nor can
the sculptor claim that the dramatist is not an author, inventor or designer because he does not discover his inventions in the form of sculpture; each
one in his particular art expresses, manifests or discovers his invention according to the rules, requirements or limitations of his own art.122
Sarony then addresses directly Burrow-Giles’s attack on photographic originality: “But it is claimed that [art of photography] is
not the subject of copyright protection because it is ‘discovered’ in
the form of a photograph.”123 In responding to this attack, Sarony
sets forth his pivotal argument, the one that the Supreme Court
ultimately adopts:
It is conceded that no such picture or scene as is depicted in [the photograph of Oscar Wilde] existed
until Sarony placed the same in order, “invented
it,” that prior to making the negative, Sarony had
had the conception of this invention in his mind, but
he had not stopped there; he had designed and set in
order the whole scene or picture which he desired to
discover or express or manifest . . . 124
The creative acts that matter most to photographic originality
are the photographer’s designing and setting the “whole scene” to
be photographed—in modern parlance, staging or posing the tableau. For Sarony, these “various acts constitute an author, inventor
and designer in the art of photography”125 because they, in effect,
construct in the real world a visible incarnation of the photograph-

122

Id. at 11. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 356 (“Sarony was the first great copyrightmeets-technology decision of United States copyright law and sets a tone of technological
neutrality that is still with us.”).
123
Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 12.
124
Id.
125
Id.
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er’s “mental conception, invention, or creation.”126 The constructed tableau is an embodied reflection of the photographer’s
mental creation.
It is critical to note that a photographer’s acts in designing and
setting the tableau are not the same acts that “express, manifest or
discover” the photographer’s mental conception, acts that Sarony
has already suggested are “not important.” Rather acts of designing and setting precede the unimportant acts of “discovering.” A
photographer’s mental conception—now embodied in the staged
tableau—is “discovered” through the act of clicking the shutter
button on the camera and developing the photograph,127 acts that
Sarony equates to a painter’s using a paintbrush or a sculptor’s using a chisel128:
[H]aving [“designed and set in order the whole
scene”] [Sarony] might have selected various forms
of making it permanent, “discovering” it; he might
have given it a permanent form, as an oil painting . . . ; or as a drawing in chalk or charcoal . . . ; or
if he were an engraver or etcher, he might have engraved or etched it; if a sculptor, he might have
made a statue of it; in any of these forms, it is conceded, his right to protection could not be questioned.129
Sarony’s brilliant move is complete. First, he refocuses attention on the photographer as an Author with a mental conception.
Second, by instilling special importance in staging the tableau to be
photographed as the embodiment of the photographer’s mental
126

Id. at 7.
For Sarony’s argument, it is particularly important that the act of clicking the shutter
button not be invested with much importance for it appears that Sarony did not actually
operate the camera. See Farley, supra note 15, at 434 (“Sarony was not a photographer in
the modern or technical sense. He was not interested in the camera work. Instead, he
regularly employed a cameraman, Benjamin Richardson, to work the camera.”).
128
See, e.g., Sarony’s Brief, supra note 100, at 13 (“[T]he picture or scene from which
[the Oscar Wilde photo] was made, had no existence until invented, created, or set in
order by Sarony. And [Burrow-Giles] admits that up to the point of fixing or making
permanent the picture or scene which is the subject of this suit, putting it into permanent,
salable form, the author or inventor took all the steps which the painter, engraver, or
sculptor would have taken.”).
129
Id. at 12.
127
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conception, Sarony diverts attention away from both the camera’s
automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude. The camera is
merely the tool for manifesting the photographer’s mental conception, now embodied in the staged tableau. The photograph is but
the object in which the staged tableau is manifested. In making this
argument, Sarony equates photography to the other visual arts.
Sarony carefully avoids dealing with instances in which a photographer doesn’t stage the tableau, but instead snaps a photograph
of a pre-existing object or scene. Sarony finesses this issue by saving it for another day:
Having admitted all this, [Burrow-Giles] still urge[s]
that all a photographer does is to take his camera,
get his focus, and produce his picture, just as the
hunter aims his gun, pulls the trigger, and lodges a
bullet in the mark. Of course it is possible that there
may be such cases, and such photographs, and when
one of them comes up for adjudications doubtless
the Court will consider that view.130
It is hard to imagine a more eloquent way to describe what in
modern parlance would be referred to as “point-and-shoot” photography. It is these two sentences, I suggest, that inspired the Supreme Court to distinguish between art photographs and ordinary
photographs, and to defer considering whether the latter are protected by copyright until a future case.
Given the document’s major influence on the Supreme Court, I
read Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony131 through the lens of
Sarony’s Brief. Accordingly, the formula for photographic originality emerging from that case was as follows:
1. Copyright Law protects as original the mental vision
of an Author, as manifested in a Writing.
2. In the case of photography, that mental vision is directly mirrored and embodied in the real world
130

Id. at 12–13. Sarony vigorously argues that his photograph falls into the artful
category: “But . . . [Burrow-Giles] ignore[s] or overlook[s] the fact that the picture or
scene from which [the photograph of Oscar Wilde] was made, had no existence until
invented, created, or set in order by Sarony.” Id. at 13.
131
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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through the photographer’s staging or posing the
tableau to be photographed. Therefore, a photograph’s originality is based on such staging or posing.
3. The acts through which the photographer “manifests” that mental vision in a Writing—using a
camera to shoot a photograph of the staged tableau—are “not important.” Those acts are necessary only to meet the constitutional requirement
that the photographer’s mental vision be fixed in a
Writing.
By elevating the photographer’s pre-shutter acts of staging the
tableau to the position of central importance for photographic originality, the Supreme Court effectively extricated copyright law
from the broader cultural debate over the camera’s mechanics and
the photograph’s veracity—in no small measure thanks to Napoleon Sarony’s litigation strategy.
2. Post Burrow-Giles Cases—The Expansion of PreShutter Acts Relevant To Photographic Originality
Within a decade after Burrow-Giles, lower courts would lose
sight of the Supreme Court’s narrow grounding of photographic
originality in acts of staging the tableau, and apply that case to find
un-staged, point-and-shoot photographs original. In so doing, they
began to expand the range of a photographer’s pre-shutter actions
deemed relevant to copyright originality, an expansion that has
continued to the present day.
The first cases after Burrow-Giles to raise issues of photographic originality were brought by Benjamin Falk, a professional portrait
photographer who, like Sarony, posed his subjects in his studio.
Accordingly, these cases fit easily within the principles set forth in
Burrow-Giles.132 Though in at least one instance Falk invited a court
132

Falk brought a series of cases alleging that others had infringed on his copyright in
photographs taken in his studio. See, e.g., Falk v. T.P. Howell & Co., 37 F. 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1888); Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. 678 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891); Falk v.
Donaldson, 57 F. 32 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893); Falk v. Schumacher, 48 F. 222 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1891); Falk v. Curtis Pub. Co., 98 F. 989 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1900); Falk v. Heffron, 56 F. 299
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1893).
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to consider camera-related acts,133 courts in these cases tended to
follow the Supreme Court’s lead by focusing narrowly on Falk’s
staging the tableau as the basis for photographic originality. Typical
is Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co.134 In defending against infringement, Brett Lithographing Co. argued that “the plaintiff is not sufficiently shown to have been the author of the photograph.”135 Relying on Burrow-Giles, the court found originality based on Falk’s
posing the scene: “[E]nough was done here by placing the persons
in position, and using the position assumed by the child at the
proper time to produce this photograph. . . . He is, and no one else
can be, the author of this.”136
By the mid-1890s, however, courts began to look to camera
manipulations alone as the basis for photograph originality. The
first such case was Bolles v. Outing Co., decided in 1897.137 The
plaintiff snapped a photograph of a yacht—an un-staged, pointand-shoot image. In responding to the defendant’s argument that
“no original, intellectual conception was involved in the production of the original photograph,”138 the Circuit Court of Appeals
stated:
Whether a photograph is a mere manual reproduction of subject-matter, or an original work of art, is a
133

In Falk v. Donaldson, Falk testified at trial that he not only posed the model, but also
“did the mechanical work of attending to the camera, focusing, and exposing the image.”
57 F. at 33. The court concluded:
An examination of the photograph shows that it is the work of an
artist.… [Falk] was an artist before he became a photographist. He
had had a large experience in taking photographs, and on this
occasion he appears to have availed himself thereof, and by the use of
lights and shadows, and various devices, to have produced a most
satisfactory result.
Id. It is possible that the ambiguous reference to “various devices” could be interpreted
as referring to camera-related actions.
134
48 F. 678 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891).
135
Id. at 679.
136
Id. The reference to the “proper time to produce this photograph” can be
interpreted as basing originality, at least in part, on Falk’s choosing the right moment to
depress the shutter button—a camera-related action.
137
77 F. 966 (2d Cir. 1897), aff’d, 175 U.S. 262 (1899); see also Teresa M. Bruce, In the
Language of Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to Adequately Account for Photography, 115
W. VA. L. REV. 93, 112 (2012) (marking Bolles as the first case).
138
Bolles, 77 F. at 970.
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question of fact; and there is certainly sufficient evidence in the present record to justify, if not to compel, the conclusion that the one in question embodies an exceptional degree of artistic conception and
expression. It required the photographer to select
and utilize the best effects of light, cloud, water, and
general surroundings, and combine them under favorable conditions for depicting vividly and accurately the view of a yacht under sail.139
The court clearly adopts Burrow-Giles’s distinction between art
photography and ordinary photography. In doing so, however, it is
not at all clear that the court understood the Supreme Court to
have limited the former category to staged or posed photographs.
For the first time, a court found a photographer’s point-and-shoot
image to be original based on its “conception and expression” by
relying entirely on camera-related acts: choice of perspective, camera adjustments and timing in capturing “the best effects of light,
cloud, water, and general surroundings.”140
Expansion of copyright protection for photographs beyond
posed images was reinforced by the Supreme Court in its 1903 de139

Id.
Id. Later courts relied on Bolles to extend copyright protection to point-and-shoot
photographs based on camera-related manipulation. For example, in Edison v. Lubin, 122
F. 240 (1903), Thomas Edison sued the defendant for infringing on photographs taken
from a film Edison created of the christening and launching of a ship. As explained by the
court, Edison created the film by combining a series of point-and-shoot photographs
involving no staging. Id. at 240–41. In responding to the defendant’s challenge that
Edison’s photographs were not original, the court looked to Bolles and relied entirely on
the photographer’s manipulating the camera:
We are further of opinion the photograph in question met the
statutory requirement of being intended to be perfected and
completed as a work of the fine art. It embodies artistic conception
and expression. To obtain it requires a study of lights, shadows,
general surroundings, and a vantage point adapted to securing the
entire effect. In [Bolles] . . . depicting a yacht under full sail was held
to constitute an original work of art . . . ; and in view of the recent
decision of the Supreme Court [Bleistein v. Donaldson Company] in
reference to the character, in that regard, of a circus poster, we have
no question that the present photograph sufficiently fulfills the
character of a work of the fine arts.
Id. at 242–43.
140

898

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:869

cision in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.141 In upholding the
copyrightability of a poster advertising a circus, Justice Holmes lowered the bar for originality, stating that an artwork “is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique.”142 Thus, even a “very modest grade of
art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone” and
“[t]hat something he may copyright” unless barred by statute.143
At the same time, the Court expressed a strong admonition against
courts making judgments of aesthetic quality.144
On the one hand, Bleistein seconded the approach in BurrowGiles by not basing copyrightability on a judgment of a photograph’s aesthetic attributes. On the other hand, by lowering the bar
for copyright protection, Bleistein undermined Burrow-Giles’s distinction between art photographs and ordinary photographs. Looking to Bleistein, that distinction was most seriously challenged in
Jewelers’ Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.,145 where
Judge Learned Hand noted that Burrow-Giles “left open an intimation that some photographs might not be protected. . . . I think that,
even as to these, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. rules, because no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the
personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely
alike.”146
Accordingly, by the early twentieth century, lower courts expanded the scope of a photographer’s pre-shutter choices that
could ground originality from staging the tableau to camera manipulation and choice of perspective. In the well-known case of Pagano v. Charles Beseler Co.,147 the plaintiff took a point-and-shoot photograph of the New York Public Library, of which the defendant
allegedly made an “exact reproduction.”148 Though involving no
141

188 U.S. 239 (1903).
Id. at 250.
143
Id.
144
See id. at 251–52 (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
145
274 F. 932 (1921).
146
Id. at 934.
147
234 F. 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
148
Id. at 964.
142
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posing or staging, the plaintiff’s pleadings mimicked language from
Burrow-Giles to describe the photograph:
In paragraph V of the complaint plaintiff’s allege
that the picture is—“from his own original conception, to which he gave visible form . . . by selecting
the position and place from which to take said picture, and the moment when the light, shade, cloud,
and sky effects upon said New York Public Library
and its surroundings combined to make a new harmonious and artistic picture.”149
The court found the point-and-shoot photograph to be original
based on camera-related choices including the timing of when to
press the shutter button:
The question is not, as defendant suggests, whether
the photograph of a public building may properly be
copyrighted. Any one may take a photograph of a
public building and of the surrounding scene. It undoubtedly requires originality to determine just
when to take the photograph, so as to bring out the
proper setting for both animate and inanimate objects, with the adjunctive features of light, shade,
position, etc. The photograph in question is admirable. The photographer caught the men and women
in not merely lifelike, but artistic, positions, and this
is especially true of the traffic policeman. The background, taking in the building of the Engineers’
Club and the small trees on Forty-First street, is
most pleasing, and the lights and shades are exceedingly well done.150
Pagano provides clear evidence that the lower courts’ revisionist reading of Burrow-Giles had taken serious hold by the early

149

Id. at 963.
Id. at 964. The court appears to ignore Bleistein’s admonition not to make judgments
as to the aesthetic quality of the image when it describes the positions of the people as
“artistic,” the background as “most pleasing,” and the lights and shades as “exceedingly
well done.” Id.

150
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twentieth century.151 Based on these early cases, contemporary
courts now look well beyond staging the tableau to a broad range of
photographer choices and actions to ground originality. Typical is
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Rogers v. Koons.152
Though citing Burrow-Giles, the court states that “[e]lements of
originality in a photograph may include posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost any other variant involved.”153 As a result of
this expansion of the grounds for photographic originality, courts
now accept that “[a]lmost any photograph ‘may claim the necessary originality to support a copyright.’”154
3. Scholarly Skepticism Over Photographic Originality
In Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court cleverly deflected attention away from concerns over the camera’s automatism and the
photograph’s verisimilitude by grounding photographic originality
in pre-shutter acts of the photographer. This approach continues to
the present day, albeit embracing a broader range of pre-shutter
acts on which to ground a photograph’s copyrightability. Accordingly, one might assume that concerns over the camera’s mechanics and the image’s truthfulness no longer plague copyright law.
151

See Hughes, supra note 15, at 363 (“Over time, courts—like critics and
commentators—became comfortable moving beyond the idea of extra-machine
composition to increasingly recognize personal expression in the process of using the
machine.”).
152
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
153
Id. at 307.
154
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 2.08[E][1]). In Mannion, Judge Lewis Kaplan
summarized contemporary copyright law by identifying three “not mutually exclusive”
respects in which a photograph can be original—rendition, timing, and creation of the
subject. 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452. Rendition includes technical aspects that do “‘not
depend on creation of the scene or object to be photographed . . . and which resides
[instead] in such specialties as angle of shot, light and shade, exposure, effects achieved
by means of filters, developing techniques, etc.’” Id. (quoting 1 HON. SIR HUGH LADDIE,
ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS § 4.57, at 229 (3d ed. 2000)
(alteration in original)). Timing includes the photographer’s decision as to when to shoot
the picture “‘by being at the right place at the right time.’” Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at
452–53 (quoting 1 LADDIE § 4.57, at 229). Creation of the subject is implicated in
photographs in which the photographer poses the subject matter before snapping the
picture, Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 453–54, the grounds upon which the Court in
Burrow-Giles relied.
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In fact, copyright scholars continue to express deep skepticism
over photographic originality,155 and this skepticism is grounded in
the enigmatic features of photography that fueled the nineteenth
century debate—the camera’s automatism156 and the photograph’s
verisimilitude.157
Relying on the device’s automatism, Professor Kathleen Connolly Butler has challenged the copyrightability of photographic
reproductions of artwork based on the mechanics of the camera.
Mirroring Burrow-Giles Lithography Co.’s attack on Napoleon Sarony’s photograph, she states:
In a photographic reproduction, the camera, not the
photographer, mimics the art. The mechanical
process involved, rather than decisions by the photographer about composition, contour, and texture,
insures that the photograph will look like the painting. The photographer may decide how to position,
light, and focus the artwork to ensure the quality of
the likeness, but every photographer will obtain a
likeness of some quality.158
Other legal critics base their skepticism toward photographic
originality on the photograph’s verisimilitude. These attacks look
to the fundamental tenet that copyright law protects only creative
expression, not facts or ideas.159 The staunchest such critic is Professor Justin Hughes. For Hughes, the “information-laden nature
of photographs”160 leads to the conclusion that for purposes of
copyright law, most photographs should be deemed unprotected
facts, not creative expression. In his view, “a large percentage of
155

See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 345–51 (expressing concern over the factual
nature of most photographs); Butler, supra note 18, at 104–13 (expressing concern over
the camera’s mechanical nature); Gorman, supra note 18, at 1594–1600 (expressing
concern over the factual nature of photographs); see also Harrison, supra note 18, at 898–
904; Madison, supra note 18, at 818–19; Miller, supra note 18, at 456–57.
156
See discussion infra Part III.A.
157
See discussion infra Part III.B.
158
Butler, supra note 18, at 113.
159
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
160
Hughes, supra note 15, at 349.
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the world’s photographs are likely not protected by American copyright law because the images lack even a modicum of creativity.”161
Before addressing these attacks by contemporary critics on the
photograph’s originality based on the camera’s automatism and the
image’s verisimilitude, I introduce the concept of depiction from art
theory into copyright law.
II. DEPICTION AND COPYRIGHT ORIGINALITY
Introducing the concept of depiction into copyright law can shed
considerable light on photographic originality. Equally important,
the concept can help to unravel confusion that has plagued both
cultural and legal critics in their attempts to make sense of the
camera’s automatism and the photograph’s verisimilitude.
A. The Concept of Depiction
What is depiction? The world is filled with objects that can be
represented in different ways. Let’s consider one such object, a
hippopotamus. The following representation is from a poem by
T.S. Eliot:
The broad-backed hippopotamus
Rests on his belly in the mud;
Although he seems so firm to us
He is merely flesh and blood.162
This is a verbal representation of a hippopotamus, employing
words as the medium of expression; such a representation is referred to as a description.

161
162

Id. at 374.
T.S. ELIOT, THE HIPPOPOTAMUS, POEMS, PLAYS AND PROSE 82–83 (1995).
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Now consider another representation of a hippopotamus, this
one by nineteenth century French photographer, Juan de Borbón:

163

This is a visual representation of the animal, one that employs a
picture rather than words as the medium of expression: such a representation is referred to as a depiction.
Notice that a description of a hippo and a depiction of a hippo
have the following in common: both represent the animal by utilizing a collection of marks on a flat surface. The description uses
words printed on a surface—language—to represent the hippo; the
depiction uses marks arranged in a particular design to represent
hippo.
We have a general understanding of how language represents.
Through linguistic conventions, words are arbitrarily assigned to
objects in the world. There is no necessary connection between the
word “hippopotamus” and the object that word represents. The
words “ippopotamo” (for Italian speakers) and “Nilpferd” (for
German speakers) equally represent a hippopotamus.
Depiction is more puzzling. In order to represent a hippopotamus pictorially, we do not have the same freedom to mark the flat

163

Juan de Borbón, The Hippopotamus at the Zoological Gardens, Regent’s Park (1852),
available
at
http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/
283086.
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surface in any way convention might come to adopt. The surface
must be marked in the correct way. But what is that correct way?164
To understand depiction, one must examine the relationship
among three things: a picture’s design markings—the marks, lines,
shadings, boundaries, contours, shapes, colors, textures, etc., that
are laid down on the picture’s surface in paint, ink, charcoal, photographic chemicals, or perhaps digital pixels on a computer
screen; a picture’s content—the real world object or event that a
viewer perceives in looking at the picture; and a picture’s subject,
the real world object itself.165 One thing is clear: we do not see a
hippopotamus in a picture in the same way that we see the real life
animal in a zoo. When looking at the picture, we perceive the animal in the design markings on the surface. We never confuse those
markings for a real hippopotamus.
Though in the past, art theorists attempted to explain how a
picture depicts a real world object by asserting that the picture resembles the object, the resemblance approach to depiction has been
largely abandoned.166 Instead, most contemporary philosophers
accept some version of the “seeing-in” approach to depiction proposed by philosopher Richard Wollheim in the 1980s.167
For Wollheim, the seeing-in approach attempts to capture what
distinguishes visual representation—depiction—from other types
of representation.168 Unlike other types of representation such as
verbal description, for Wollheim a picture has the unique ability to
trigger what he refers to as the twofold experience of seeing-in.169 In
looking at a picture, a viewer sees both a marked two-dimensional
surface and, at the same time, sees an object or scene in that marked
164

See R.D. HOPKINS, DEPICTION, CONCISE ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 202–03 (2000) (establishing a conceptual framework).
165
DOMINIC LOPES, UNDERSTANDING PICTURES 3–4 (1996).
166
DOMINIC LOPES, SIGHT AND SENSIBILITY 26 (2005) (“Fatal difficulties have made
resemblance theories historical curiosities.”).
167
See, e.g., ANTHONY SAVILE & RICHARD WOLLHEIM, IMAGINATION AND PICTORIAL
UNDERSTANDING, 60 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, SUPPLEMENTARY
VOLUMES 19–60 (1986).
168
See id. at 46; see also Bantinaki, supra note 27, at 128 (“By means of [the] notion [of
twofoldness] Wollheim aimed to highlight the fact that in seeing a picture the viewer can
be visually aware of both the object that is being depicted and the medium in a single
perceptual act.”).
169
See WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 214.
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surface. It is by virtue of a picture’s ability to trigger such a twofold
perceptual experience that makes it a depiction.170 Though Wollheim’s scholarship has triggered considerable discussion and criticism,171 most modern scholars agree that linking depiction to a twofold perceptual experience is a major advance in understanding
how pictures operate in our lives.172
The insights offered by this Article flow from a simple observation: a photograph of a real world object is a depiction. Accordingly,
such a photograph has two folds. The first fold consists of the design markings on the surface of the photographic paper (or pixels
on a computer screen). The second fold consists of the picture’s
content—the real world object or scene that a viewer perceives in
the design markings. Consider de Borbón’s photograph of a hippopotamus.173 It depicts the animal. In looking at the photograph, a
viewer is aware that she is looking at design markings on a picture’s
surface (and not at the animal itself). At the same time, the viewer
is aware that she is seeing a real world object in those surface design
markings—a hippopotamus.
B. The Two Folds of Depiction and Copyright Originality
The fundamental thesis of this Article is that, for purposes of
copyright law, what makes a picture original are first and foremost
the artist’s choices and actions that result in the placement of design markings on the picture’s surface. The picture’s content—the
object or scene that a viewer perceives in those markings—is, at
170

See WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 217–18; see also Robert Hopkins, Inflected Pictorial
Experience: Its Treatment and Significance, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25,
at 152 (“If I go to the British Museum and look at [a Rembrandt drawing of a pastor], I see
ink marks on a piece of yellowed paper. But I also (in some sense) see a man, holding his
left hand outward, as if engaged in conversation. My experience of the picture thus has
two dimensions to its content. It represents what is before me, a marked surface; and it
represents something else, a man with certain features. When I see one thing as a picture
of something else, my experience has this double content. This is how I know that a
picture is before me, and how I know what the picture’s own content is, what it
depicts.”).
171
See Bantinaki, supra note 27, at 129 n.3 (discussing objections to Wollheim’s seeingin approach to depiction).
172
See, e.g., id. at 128 (describing Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness as an “important
contribution[] to the study of depiction”).
173
See supra note 163.
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most, secondary to a determination of originality. This thesis applies to any graphic work that depicts an object or scene—a painting, a lithograph, an etching, or a photograph. 174
1. The First Fold of Depiction—Photographic Originality is
Based Primarily on Choices and Actions Related to Placing
Design Markings on a Picture’s Surface
Consider an 1887 work by Van Gogh, Self-Portrait with a Straw
Hat:

175

What makes this painting original?
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,176 the
Supreme Court set forth two criteria of originality: “[T]he work
[must have been] independently created by the author (as opposed
to copied from other works), and . . . it [must] possess[] at least
some minimal degree of creativity.”177 As noted above, I refer to

174

Throughout this Article, I am considering figurative representational pictures,
pictures that are intended to depict real world objects or scenes. The remarks herein do
not apply, for example, to abstract paintings, though some philosophers suggest that one
could view such paintings as representations. See, e.g., LOPES, UNDERSTANDING
PICTURES, supra note 165, at 5–6 (explaining that abstract paintings might be considered
to be representational).
175
Vincent Van Gogh, Self-Portrait with a Straw Hat (1887), available at
http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/436532.
176
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
177
Id. at 345.
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these as the “non-copying” and the “minimal creativity” criteria.178
There is little doubt that the painting satisfies the non-copying
criterion. It originated from Van Gogh and did not copy another
artist’s work. Commentators agree that determining whether a
work of art satisfies the non-copying criterion is rarely difficult.179
Though few would question that the painting satisfies Feist’s
minimal creativity criterion, explaining how it does so is more challenging. Viewing the painting as a depiction aids in this endeavor.
We first confront a stumbling block in copyright law. It may
seem obvious that determining whether a picture is minimally creative must turn on assessing the aesthetic quality of how the design
markings are arrayed on the picture’s surface—depiction’s first
fold. In fact, in Burrow-Giles, the Supreme Court did refer to the
photograph of Oscar Wilde as a “useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture.”180 In so doing, it appeared that the
Court was in fact making a judgment of the image’s aesthetic quality. Nonetheless, the Court then went on to locate originality in preshutter acts of the photographer.181 Most commentators agree that
the Court’s passing reference to the aesthetics of Sarony’s image
carries little precedential weight in determining photographic originality.182
Any doubts as to whether courts should make judgments of aesthetic quality in determining originality were laid to rest by Bleis-

178

See supra note 29.
See, e.g., Robert Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or
Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2001–2002) (“The most common understanding
of authorship—a word whose root is in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution—is that
a work must ‘originate’ with the putative author, and that it not be slavishly copied from
another. Whether a work is copied or is a product of independent origination usually
invites a straightforward and objective factual determination, even though proof is
typically circumstantial. Courts rarely have to make value judgments.”).
180
Burrow-Giles Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
181
Id.
182
See, e.g., Farley, supra note 15, at 431 (“The Court could have focused on the
photograph itself, evaluating originality as measured by aesthetics, but instead it focused
on how the photographer created the subject of the photograph. That is, it does not
evaluate the final product for signs of the author, but rather evaluates the practice as
authorial.”).
179
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tein’s strong admonition against doing so.183 Some courts and
commentators continue to argue that, in the end, originality must
adhere in aesthetic attributes of the picture itself, not in the artist’s
actions in creating the picture.184 Nonetheless, following Bleistein,
most courts now look solely to the photographer’s pre-shutter
choices and actions to ground originality, not aesthetic attributes of
the picture.185 After Feist the relevant inquiry for determining originality is whether such choices and actions evidence a minimally
creative input of the artist’s personality into the work rather than
mere “sweat of the brow,” a mindless exertion of effort.186
Accordingly, determining whether Van Gogh’s painting is original becomes a question of whether the artist’s choices and actions
related to marking the canvas’s surface evidence an input of Van
Gogh’s creative personality. Such choices and actions include decisions that were made well before the artist picked up a brush such
as mixing paint (or some other medium) on a palette and choosing
which tools to use. Perhaps most importantly, relevant to originality are the choices and actions the artist makes while brushing paint
onto the canvas. Few would argue that Van Gogh’s choices and
actions do not far exceed the minimally creative standard.
183

See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits.”).
184
See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“[C]ourts have not always distinguished between decisions that a photographer makes in
creating a photograph and the originality of the final product. . . . Decisions about film,
camera, and lens, for example, often bear on whether an image is original. But the fact
that a photographer made such choices does not alone make the image original. . . .
Protection derives from the features of the work itself, not the effort that goes into it.”);
see also Hughes, supra note 15, at 409 (“It is . . . acceptable to say that ‘the creative
decisions involved in producing a photograph may render it sufficiently original to be
copyrightable,’ but originality must be in the visible effects in the work itself, not in the
means of achieving those effects.”).
185
See Hughes, supra note 15 at 409 (“[A]s soon as a judge starts assessing originality in
the visual image, it is easy to slip into the murky zone of artistic judgments that Bleistein
warns judges to avoid. . . . But a jurist who takes to heart Holmes’s admonition to avoid
judging ‘the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits’ will quickly become uncomfortable trying to describe the nuanced elements of a
photograph. The simplest solution is to focus on creative choices and decisions.”).
186
See Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1991)
(enumerating the flaws of “sweat of the brow” as a doctrine).
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How do we determine whether de Borbón’s photograph of a
hippopotamus is original? We do so in the exact same way that we
determined whether Van Gogh’s painting is original. We look to
the photographer’s choices and actions that resulted in design
markings being arrayed on the photographic paper. These include
de Borbón’s first coating that paper with salt and silver nitrate;
choosing a camera and lens; adjusting the camera settings; choosing a perspective from which to aim the camera at the animal; adjusting artificial lighting and screens to change the light and shadow
on the animal; and finally choosing the exact moment at which to
click the shutter button.187 If those choices and actions—all related
to the first fold of depiction—evidence de Borbón’s infusing a minimally creative degree of his personality into the image, the photograph is original.
Of course, in looking at a photograph, a viewer sees both surface design markings and the content of the photograph at the same
time.188 That’s Wollheim’s whole point189—a depiction is characterized by its ability to cause that twofold experience in the viewer.
In de Borbón’s photograph we see the image’s content—the hippo—knowing all the while that we are looking at a picture composed of design markings on photographic paper. With effort, however, a viewer can consciously focus on one of the two folds of de187

Throughout this Article, I do not consider post-shutter manipulation of the
photograph in the darkroom or on a computer (“photoshopping”) to be relevant to
originality. Both legal commentators and art theorists agree that such manipulations
undermine the conventional bases on which we understand an image to be a
“photograph.” See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at 366 (“[In discussing originality],
[c]ourts and law commentators almost never mention airbrushing, photomontage, or
‘composition’ techniques involving multiple negatives, although such techniques have
been in limited use since the mid-nineteenth century and the results of such techniques
would support a finding of originality. Why? We can conjecture that the main reason is
that these have not been seen as proper photography among photography professionals
and cognoscenti. . . . [A]s long as most photographers accepted these conventional limits
of the medium—that is, the exclusion of optical or chemical manipulations—then the
disputes that would come before courts would be so limited.”).
188
See, e.g., Dominic McIver Lopes, The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency, 112
MIND 433, 440 (2003) (“In normal circumstances, seeing through a photograph happens
simultaneously with seeing the photographic surface itself and is consistent with the belief
that what is before one’s eyes is a photograph, not the photographed object. Photographic
transparency is not photographic invisibility.”).
189
See WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 213–14.
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piction—what has been described as “separation seeing-in.”190 Determining whether a picture is original for copyright purposes
mandates that a viewer engage in separation seeing-in and focus
mainly on the design markings on the image’s surface and the artist’s relationship to those markings.
2. The Second Fold of Depiction—The Object or Scene
Perceived By a Viewer in a Photograph is Only Secondarily
Related to Copyright Originality
What is the relevance of the picture’s subject—the real world
object or scene that a photographer chooses to shoot and that a
viewer perceives in the photograph—to the image’s originality?
Generally, the object or scene a viewer perceives in a painting
or a photograph has little impact on the image’s originality. Every
representational painter chooses something to paint. Every photographer chooses something at which to point the camera. It is impossible to judge the creativity of either choice apart from the artist’s success or failure in placing design markings on the surface of
the canvas or photographic paper. A painting is original not because the painter creatively chose a particular object or scene to
paint. Rather, its originality results from the painter’s choices and
actions in translating his intellectual vision onto the surface of the
canvas. Similarly, a photograph’s originality does not generally relate to the choice of an object or scene at which to point the camera. Rather the resulting image will be original because of the photographer’s creative choices and actions related to marking the surface of the photographic paper. Accordingly, the choice of an object or scene to paint or photograph rarely has significance for copyright protection.191
190

See John H. Brown, Seeing Things in Pictures, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 25, at 208, 210–14 (explaining separation seeing-in); see also Bantinaki, supra note 27,
at 143 (“[In separation seeing-in] the material elements on the picture’s surface are seen
as forming a meaningful whole ….”).
191
See, e.g., WILLIAM PATRY, 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:118 (2010) (“The nature of
photographic authorship is not at all dependent upon or influenced by the uniqueness or
even protectability of the objects photographed. An original photograph of a common
flower (think of Georgia O’Keeffe) is entitled to protection no differently from an original
photograph of an original sculpture. Photographic authorship lies not in the object
captured by the photographer (although elements of layout or placement of that object or
objects may form a basis of protection), but rather in the creative choices made by the
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On occasion, however, the object or scene that a viewer
perceives in a painting or photograph may impact copyright
originality.
In instances in which the artist stages or poses the scene that
she ultimately paints or photographs, those actions enhance the
completed work’s originality because they evidence an additional
input of personality into the work. Thus, an artist’s arranging fruit
on a table for a still life prior to painting or photographing that tableau enhances the resulting image’s originality for copyright purposes. Nonetheless, there is no requirement that a photographer
stage the tableau in order for the resulting picture to be original.
On rare occasion the choice of an object to paint or photograph
can undermine the completed work’s originality. This occurs when
the graphic image runs afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion.192
Commentators generally agree that an artwork runs afoul of this

photographer about how to capture the object, as well as postphotographic choices made
in developing and printing the work.”).
192
It is important to distinguish copying for purposes of originality from copying for
purposes of infringement under Section 106(1), the Reproduction Right. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(1) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords …”). Consider a photograph of a copyright protected sculpture. Assume
first that the photograph is licensed. Irrespective of whether the photograph is properly
characterized as a derivative work, see, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int., 586 F.3d 513,
518 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Whether photographs of a copyrighted work are derivative works is
the subject of deep disagreement among courts and commentators alike.”), it is now
generally accepted that for such a photograph to be original, “the relevant standard is
whether [it] contains a ‘nontrivial’ variation from the preexisting work.” See id. at 520
(quoting NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, §§ 3.01, 3.03[A]). If such a variation exists,
the photograph does not run afoul of Feist’s non-copying requirement.
Now assume the same photograph to be unlicensed. Whether or not it copied the
depicted sculpture for purposes of infringement analysis would be determined by the more
protective “substantially similar” test. Pursuant to that standard, it might well be found
to infringe despite a nontrivial variation from the preexisting work. See, e.g., Gentieu v.
Tony Stone Images, 255 F. Supp. 2d 838, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“Substantial similarity is
determined by applying the ordinary observer test: ‘whether the accused work is so
similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the
defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible [sic] expression by taking
material of substance and value.’”) (quoting Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright
Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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requirement only when it slavishly copies another work, copies it
“outright in its entirety.”193
In the realm of the graphic arts, what constitutes slavish copying?194 Let’s begin with painting. An artist who paints an exact,
brushstroke-for-brushstroke copy of a Grand Master in a museum
will, in all likelihood, run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion and
her painting will not be deemed original. This example illustrates
the importance of viewing Feist’s two criteria as independent of
one another.195 It does not follow that because the painter has slavishly copied the existing work, her actions lack minimal creativity.
Creating an exact copy of another painting entails an extensive array of creative choices and actions related to mixing paints and imitating brushstrokes, actions that far exceed the threshold of minimal creativity. For copyright purposes, the problem with the finished work is copying, not lack of minimal creativity.
How can a photograph run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion and thereby be unoriginal? There are three ways in which this
can occur.
1. A photograph of another photograph (such as those created
by postmodern artist Sherrie Levine)196 will run afoul of the
non-copying criterion because such an image slavishly appropriates each and every creative action and decision made

193

See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 1504 (noting that Feist prohibits only a “work [that]
has been copied outright in its entirety”); see also Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,
329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (“‘Originality . . . means little more than a prohibition
on actual copying’ . . . any more demanding requirement would be burdensome to enforce
and would involve judges in making aesthetic judgments, which few judges are competent
to make.” (quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 489 (9th Cir.
2000))).
194
See Terry S. Kogan, Photographic Reproductions, Copyright and the Slavish Copy, 35
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 476–93 (2012) (exploring the meaning of “slavish copying”).
195
See PATRY, supra note 191, § 3.31 (“There is thus no nexus between independent
creation and the amount of creativity required for the work to be copyrightable.”).
196
Diarmuid Costello and Margaret Iversen describe Sherrie Levine’s “interest in the
photograph as a kind of pictorial readymade that can be appropriated and repurposed in
ways that limit authorial control. . . . [Levine was interested] in photography as a resource
for art precisely insofar as it might be thought to relieve [her] of certain burdens of artistic
control.” Costello & Iversen, supra note 35, at 686–87.
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by the first photographer that resulted in design markings
being placed on the image’s surface. 197
2. A photographer who restages in minute detail the tableau
that another photographer created for a pre-existing a photograph will run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion. In
such a case, the later photographer will have slavishly copied the first photographer’s creative acts in staging the
tableau to be photographed, the one instance in which the
second fold of depiction impacts copyright originality.198
3. There is a third way in which a new photograph might run
afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion, one that relates to the
first fold of depiction. Since photographic originality is
based primarily on the photographer’s pre-shutter choices
and actions, completeness requires that we consider the
possibility of a photographer’s slavishly copying those
choices and actions of another photographer.
Imagine the following: a professional photographer, Photopro,
hikes to the top of a cliff in a national park to photograph the sunset. He situates his tripod, points his camera, and adjusts the camera settings. Assume he chooses a complex combination of settings
to exaggerate the intensity of the sunset. He then presses the shutter button at the moment of sunset.
Assume further that another professional photographer, Hiker,
followed Photopro to the top of the cliff. He carefully notes each
and every camera and tripod setting utilized by Photopro. Moreover, he casually inquires of Photopro what type of film he is using.
197

In all likelihood, a photograph that slavishly re-photographs an existing copyright
protected photograph would also infringe on that protected image. See, e.g., Hughes,
supra note 15, at 393. (“It is important to understand that unauthorized, nontransformative, and slavish reproduction of [an] entire photograph by a newspaper, news
service, or television station is—and should be—an infringement of copyright.”).
198
This is effectively what occurred in Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914). A
photographer took a picture of a nude model entitled “Grace of Youth.” Id. at 931. He
sold both the photograph and its copyright to the plaintiff. Id. Two years later, the
photographer recreated the tableau of his earlier work using the same model in an
identical pose, and took a new photograph he entitled “Cherry Ripe.” Id. at 930. The
Court found that the later image infringed on the earlier image. Id. at 931–32. As a slavish
copy of the tableau that was staged for the first photograph, the later photograph would
also run afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion.
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The next evening Hiker returns to the cliff bringing with him the
identical type of camera, film and tripod used by Photopro. Hiker
places his tripod in the dirt markings that indicate the exact location from which Photopro snapped his photo the previous evening.
Choosing the identical camera angle and settings, Hiker snaps a
picture at the moment of sunset. (Assume that atmospheric conditions on the two days are identical.) Given the centrality to photographic originality of actions related to choosing a camera, film,
camera angle, and camera settings, one might well conclude that
Hiker has slavishly copied that which is original to Photopro’s image. If so, Hiker’s photograph runs afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion and is not original.199
It is important to point out that a photographer’s doing no
more than pointing her camera at the exact same object or scene
previously photographed by another photographer does not run
afoul of Feist’s non-copying criterion. In the realm of the graphic
arts no one has a monopoly over depicting a pre-existing object or
scene.200 The first tourist to take a photograph of the Grand Canyon from a newly opened scenic overlook in a national park has no
greater copyright over her image of that natural wonder than the
hundredth tourist who takes a photograph from the same overlook.
Nonetheless, the first photographer’s work is entitled to “thin”
protection: “The nature of this thin copyright may mean that the
photograph is effectively protected from slavish, reprographic copying, but has little protection against unauthorized copying of
most elements in a derivative work.”201

199

See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 13.03[B][2][b] (“Liability . . . cannot
arise to the extent that the similarity between plaintiff’s and defendant’s work is that both
graphically reproduce an object exactly as it occurs in nature.”).
201
Hughes, supra note 15, at 392; see also SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117
F. Supp. 2d 301, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that photographs of pre-existing objects are
“only protected from verbatim copying”).
200
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III. THE ENIGMA OF PHOTOGRAPHY: THE CAMERA’S
AUTOMATISM AND THE PHOTOGRAPH’S
VERISIMILITUDE DO NOT UNDERMINE
COPYRIGHT ORIGINALITY
We come full circle to the enigma of photography. Throughout
its history, cultural and legal critics have focused on the two most
distinctive attributes of the technology—the camera’s automatism
and the image’s verisimilitude—to challenge photography as an art
form.
If, as argued above,202 photographic originality inheres primarily in a photographer’s choices and actions that result in the placement of design markings on the image’s surface, the major challenge to photographic originality is automatism. Do the mechanics
of the camera so over-determine the appearance of the resulting
image that the photographer is left with little opportunity to inject
her own personality into the photograph, irrespective of her choices and actions related to marking the surface?
In contrast, because the choice of an object to photograph is, at
most, secondarily related to a photograph’s originality, the claim of
critics that most photographs are unoriginal because of their verisimilitude—their facticity—is misconceived. A photograph of a hippopotamus is no less original because of its asserted factual nature
than is a realistic painting of the same animal.
The attacks on photographic originality based on automatism
and verisimilitude are not unique to legal critics. Art theorists Diarmuid Costello and Dawn Phillips describe “[t]hree widespread
and contentious intuitions [that] play a role in most discussions of
photography,” intuitions that link the camera’s automatism with
the image’s truthfulness:203
1) The photographic process is, in some sense, automatic.
2) The resultant images are, in some sense, realistic.

202
203

See supra Part II.B.1.
Costello & Phillips, supra note 46, at 2.
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3) The realism of photographs, in some sense, depends on the automatism of the photographic
process.204
They explain:
In these formulations the term “automatic” stands
proxy for a variety of notions used to characterise
the photographic process, such as: mechanical,
mind-independent, agent-less, natural, causal, physical, unmediated. The term “realistic” could be replaced by an equally large variety of terms, used to
characterise the status of photographs, such as: authentic, faithful, objective, truthful, accurate.205
Separating issues of the camera’s automatism from issues of
the image’s verisimilitude can shed light on the confusion that has
arisen in both art theory and legal commentary over the artistic nature of the photograph. Accordingly, in Part III.A. below, I confront the challenge based on automatism that the mechanical nature of the camera precludes most photographs from satisfying
copyright law’s threshold requirement of minimal creativity. In
Part III.B. below, I confront the challenge based on verisimilitude
that, because of their inherent factual nature, most photographs do
not satisfy Feist’s requirements for originality.
A. Automatism—The Mechanics of the Camera Do Not Defeat
Copyright Originality206
Philosopher Dawn Wilson explains the challenge that the camera’s automatism poses to considering a photograph an artwork:
“Automatism” is the notion that a photograph is
the product of a nonconscious, natural, or mechanical process. This being so, it is supposed that a photograph is not primarily the product of an agent’s
conscious control, and it is inferred that an artistic
204

Id.
Id.
206
Photography and automatism were the subjects of a 2012 Symposium, Agency and
Automatism: Photography as Art Since the Sixties, 38 CRITICAL INQUIRY 679 (2012), and a
2013 Symposium, 70 J. OF AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 1 (2013).
205
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agent can have only a limited or inhibited responsibility for the salient features of a photograph. The
idea that scope for artistic intentionality is diminished by automatism has been a basis for treating
photographs as inferior to other art forms and remains a hurdle for evaluations of photography in the
philosophy of art. 207
The mechanics of the camera have also grounded the attack of
legal critics on photographic originality from the moment that Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. asserted in its 1884 Supreme Court
brief that “in photography no intellectual and original labor is required.”208
In this attack, cultural and legal critics inevitably compare photography to painting. Carol Armstrong caricatures this comparison:
[A photograph supposedly captures] unwilled facts
caught willy-nilly, automatically, and all at once by
the camera without any intervention of the photographer’s agency save for the quick gesture of raising the camera and clicking the shutter. This supposed automation stands in marked contrast to how
Renaissance fresco painters must have painted the
Passion cycles, with or without the aid of a team of
workshop assistants: stroke by intentional
stroke .…209
A painting is perceived as having an intentional relationship to
the subject that appears in the painting. Because every brushstroke
is intentionally placed onto the canvas, the resulting image is the
direct result of the painter’s creative mental vision. In contrast, a
photograph has but a causal relationship to its subject. Irrespective
of how a photographer may perceive the subject to be photographed, the mechanics of the camera assure that the resulting im-

207

Dawn M. Wilson, Facing the Camera: Self-Portraits of Photographers as Artists, J. OF
AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 55 (2012).
208
Burrow-Giles’s Brief, supra note 14, at 10.
209
Carol Armstrong, Automatism and Agency Intertwined: A Spectrum of Photographic
Intentionality, 38 CRITICAL INQUIRY 705, 706–07 (2012).
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age “is causally determined by the photographed scene, rather than
intentionally determined by the photographer.”210
In thinking about photography, art theorists have recently challenged the supposed opposition between intentionality and causality and, in so doing, have questioned whether the mechanical nature
of the camera necessarily diminishes the creativity of the photograph. Costello and Phillips explain:
The intuition that the photographic process is in
some sense automatic is supposed to imply that the
process takes place independently of human agency.
It is possible for a photograph to be produced “automatically”—if, say, a curtain blown by the wind
knocks a Polaroid camera onto the floor and trips
the shutter. The process in cases of “accidental
photographs” seems automatic precisely because it
occurs without any human intervention or action: if
any human agency were involved, the process would
be only partly automatic. However, treating “automatism” and “agency” in general as a zero-sum
opposition is incoherent.211
The cultural and legal attacks on photographic originality based
on automatism are the direct result of investing overwhelming importance in a single act—clicking the camera’s shutter button. But
why should this act alone be the only act of significance to determining whether a photograph is original? Expanding the time frame
surrounding the moment of snapping the picture reveals a much
broader range of choices and actions that impact the image’s creativity. In fact, art theorists locate such creativity in the very same
acts on which courts historically have relied to ground photographic originality. For example, Carol Armstrong notes that a photographer maintains control over

210

Costello & Lopes, supra note 44, at 2; see also Scott Walden, Objectivity in
Photography, 45 BRIT. J. OF AESTHETICS 258, 259 (2005) (“A photographer who is
hallucinating that a red apple is green will nonetheless produce an image that depicts the
apple as red. The exclusion of the photographer’s mental states renders photographs
objective . . . .”).
211
Costello & Phillips, supra note 46, at 15.
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the selection and arrangement of subject matter,
lighting, framing, depth of field, width of aperture,
speed of film and shutter, choice of lens, and positioning of the camera—to which can be added the
many developing, cropping, and printing choices
that must then be made, not to mention captioning,
text, and other kinds of contextualization—as determining the meanings that a viewer of the image
would take away from it.212
At the same time, scholars point out that, because an artist’s
painting a canvas involves rote brush movements learned over
many years, the caricatured vision that a painter’s every brushstroke is intentional and mediated through the artist’s mind is subject to serious challenge.213
Perhaps the strongest response to the attack on photographic
originality based on automatism is that it is the element of
chance—the giving up of total control over the final image—that
embodies what is most unique to photography as an art form.
“[T]here is something within the photographic itself that calls for
notions of the automatic, the arbitrary and the unwilled, the accidental and the random, chance and contingency, more than other
media such as painting.”214 Were copyright law to insist on total
control as a necessary indicium of originality, it would be at odds
with the contemporary art world’s embracing the creative potential
of chance in photography. Costello and Iverson observe: “An adequate conception of photographic art should provide scope for both
highly skilled photographic practices that follow in the tradition of
the fine arts, and for chance-inflected practices that aspire, by

212

Armstrong, supra note 209, at 707–08.
Id. at 710–11 (“[T]he paintbrush has its own automatism, and no author of a painting
is fully in conscious control of everything he or she does with that brush. . . . [T]he
intentionality of the process of painting . . . can be seen to be riven with the obduracy of
materials and the mechanicalness of applying stroke after stroke to the canvas in a learned
routine become second nature. It is surely a different process from the decision making of
the street photographer—more tactile than purely optical—but not because it is all
agency and no automatism.”).
214
Id. at 706.
213
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means of the camera’s automaticity, to short-circuit artistic convention and habits of mind alike.”215
B. Verisimilitude—A Photograph Is Not a Fact
We come to the major argument that contemporary legal critics
level against photographic originality: most photographs are uncreative facts that run afoul of the fundamental tenet that copyright
law protects only creative expression, not facts or ideas.216
This argument is neither new nor unique to legal critics. Based
on the image’s verisimilitude—its accuracy and utter truthfulness—mid-nineteenth century critics questioned whether a photograph could be considered fine art. For example, in 1859, art critic
Francis Frith claimed that photography was “ . . . too truthful. It
insists upon giving us ‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth.’”217 Professor Justin Hughes argues that little has
changed in 150 years: “This understanding of photographs as simple conveyors of truth is still very much alive, not just in our grocery store tabloids (yes, that’s what she looks like without make-

215

Costello & Iverson, supra note 35, at 693.
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (“This
Court has long recognized that the fact/expression dichotomy limits severely the scope of
protection in fact-based works.”). Some courts and commentators have questioned
whether copyright law’s distinction between fact and expression even makes sense when
applied to graphic works. See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444,
455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Noting that “[i]t is true that an axiom of copyright law is that
copyright does not protect ‘ideas,’ only their expression,” the court continues:
In the visual arts, the distinction breaks down. For one thing, it is
impossible in most cases to speak of the particular “idea” captured,
embodied, or conveyed by a work of art because every observer will
have a different interpretation. Furthermore, it is not clear that there
is any real distinction between the idea in a work of art and its
expression. An artist’s idea, among other things, is to depict a
particular subject in a particular way.
Id. at 458. See also id. at 461 (“In the context of photography, the idea/expression
distinction is not useful or relevant.”); see also Teresa M. Bruce, In the Language of
Pictures: How Copyright Law Fails to Adequately Account for Photography, 115 W. VA. L. REV.
93, 97, 127 (2012) (“In fact, a photograph’s facts and expression are, arguably, inseparably
wed. . . . For photographic works, especially straight photographs, the problem of
untangling facts and expression is particularly thorny.”).
217
Frith, supra note 11, at 72, in MARIEN PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 77.
216
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up), but also in much of twentieth century intellectual discourse on
photography.”218
Looking to the photograph’s “fact bearing capacity,”219 “information laden nature,”220 and “fact-recording nature,”221
Hughes launches a head-on assault on photographic originality. He
concludes that “a large percentage of the world’s photographs are
likely not protected by American copyright law because the images
lack even a modicum of creativity. . . . [W]e have probably already
crossed a threshold beyond which most of the world’s photographic images are not truly protected by copyright.”222 Because Hughes
is the most articulate skeptic who challenges photographic originality based on the factual nature of photographs, I will focus on his
arguments.
For Hughes, most photographs fail to satisfy Feist’s minimal
creativity criterion because they merely capture a “preexisting reality.”223 Hughes analogizes photographs to databases and, as such,
argues that they are entitled at most to thin protection for the selection and arrangement of the facts that appear in the image.224
Hughes grants that a few photographs are entitled to full copyright protection as original creative art works. In the spirit of Burrow-Giles, he would extend protection to images that result from
the photographer’s “arranging the tableau.”225 “[C]reating the
scene or subject captured in the photograph, should be the first
category of originality in a photograph because it occurs before any
photographic processes and is independent of any decisions concerning photographic equipment. . . . [C]omposing and posing can
form a significant basis for copyright.”226
218

Hughes, supra note 15, at 344.
Id. at 348.
220
Id. at 349.
221
Id. at 355.
222
Id. at 374.
223
Id. at 361.
224
See, e.g., id. at 350 (“Seeing the parallel between photographs and databases has
great dividends for those working in copyright law. It is no accident that the strongest,
most stable bases for copyright protection of a photograph are selection and arrangement—
the Feist foundation for copyright in compilations of data.”).
225
Id. at 412.
226
Id. at 402.
219
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With respect to the vast majority of photographs that merely
capture an “independent reality,” however, Hughes argues that
photography is being used only for a “naïve or descriptive function,” 227 not a creative one. There is “an insufficient ‘trace of the
personal vision of whoever is behind the camera’” for such images
to be considered original.228
Hughes’s arguments echo in important respects those of art
theorist Roger Scruton. In a seminal work published in 1983,229
Scruton asserts that, because of the mechanical nature of the technology, any aesthetic interest in a photograph “appl[ies] to features
of the object photographed, not to features of the photograph itself. . . . Photographs may serve as conduits for aesthetic interest,
but they cannot be objects of aesthetic interest in their own
right . . . .”230 Scruton argues that “if one finds a photograph beautiful, it is because one finds something beautiful in its subject.”231
In a similar vein, Hughes believes that the vast majority of photographs merely document factual information about their content.
Most photographs qua photographs have no aesthetic value that is
worthy of copyright protection.
The core of Hughes’s argument that most photographs are uncreative facts unworthy of copyright protection is encapsulated in
the following statement: “It is important to recognize that where
the content of the photograph has an independent reality, and the
photographer seeks only to achieve and does in fact achieve an accurate representation of that independent reality, there is a good
chance that the photograph has no copyright protection at all.”232
I will respond to Professor Hughes by arguing first that the content of a photograph—what a viewer perceives in the image—rarely
impacts photographic originality.233 I will then argue that a photograph of any real world object that has an “independent reality” is
227

Id. at 367, 381.
Id. at 381.
229
Roger Scruton, Photography and Representation, in THE AESTHETIC
UNDERSTANDING: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND CULTURE 102 (1983).
230
Dominic McIver Lopes, The Aesthetics of Photographic Transparency, 112 MIND 433,
435 (2003) (discussing Scruton’s theory of photography).
231
Scruton, supra note 229, at 114.
232
Hughes, supra note 15, at 374.
233
See infra Part III.B.1.
228
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no more a fact than a painting of the same object.234 I will then suggest that, contra Hughes and Scruton, a photograph of a real world
object—“an independent reality”—can hold an aesthetic interest
independent of any aesthetic interest in the actual object itself.235
Finally, I will suggest that a photograph’s accuracy does not detract
from its creativity for purposes of photographic originality.236
1. Attacking a Photograph’s Copyrightability Based on the
Image’s Content Locates Originality in the Wrong
Place
I return to this Article’s fundamental premise: a photograph is
a depiction with two folds, the first relating to the image’s surface
design markings and the second relating to the content a viewer
perceives in the image. Photographic originality inheres primarily
in the first fold. What is perceived in the image, its content, rarely
impacts copyright originality.
Hughes claims that, because their content “has an independent
reality,” most photographs are mere facts unworthy of copyright
protection.237 But focusing on a photograph’s content—the second
fold of depiction—locates copyright originality in the wrong place.
That argument ignores entirely the importance of a photograph’s
surface design markings to assessing originality.
Given Hughes’s focus on a photograph’s content, it is clear
why he limits copyright protection to instances in which the photographer stages the tableau that a viewer perceives in the image.
Those are the rare instances in which the second fold of depiction
affirmatively impacts originality. But overlooking the photograph’s
surface design markings and the photographer’s relationship to
those markings keeps Hughes from appreciating the most important way in which a photographer infuses her image with creative
personality.238
234

See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.3.
236
See infra Part III.B.4.
237
Hughes, supra note 15, at 374.
238
In a previous article, I offered an explanation as to why viewers tend to ignore a
photograph’s surface design markings when looking at photographic reproductions of art.
Turning to recent art and visual theory, I argued,
235
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Analogizing a photograph to a factual database makes sense only if originality depends on the various objects that a viewer perceives in the image. It is those objects that are the supposed facts that
the photographer selects and arranges in choosing a perspective
from which to shoot the picture. In contrast, if what matters most
to copyright originality are the photographer’s creative choices and
actions related to the placement of surface design markings, there
are no facts to be selected and arranged. The analogy to a database
collapses.
2. A Photograph is Not Always More Truthful Than a
Painting
Perhaps Professor Hughes would challenge the underlying
premise of this Article that one can separate the two folds of depiction when considering photographic originality. He might argue
that, in contrast to other graphic artworks, photographs are unique
in that they always capture truths about the world. A photograph’s
surface design markings are inextricably linked to the image’s displaying the facts that a viewer perceives in a photograph. It is this
attribute that dooms their creativity.
Art theorists cast this debate in terms of whether a photograph
has an epistemic advantage over other graphic works. A photograph
has an epistemic advantage if it is more likely than other graphic
images to lead a viewer to true beliefs about the world.239 Costello
and Phillips note that it is often assumed that, if a photograph has
such an advantage, it undermines its artistic nature: “At first blush
photography’s epistemic and aesthetic value certainly seem to be in
competition: the more photography is said to be epistemically privileged, in virtue of being an objective, mind-independent record of
the facts, the less capacity it seems to have for aesthetic value . . .
a viewer tends to look through [a photograph] as though it were
transparent, and see only the [object] depicted.… The viewer erases
from his mind the fact that he is actually looking at a photograph with
unique photographic attributes—erasing even the existence of the
photographer responsible for that image, including the range of
artistic judgments and choices that went into producing the
photographic reproduction.
Kogan, supra note 194, at 447–48 (emphasis added).
239
See Walden, supra note 210, at 261–62.
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.”240 This assumption underlies Professor Hughes’s argument that
a photograph’s factual nature undermines its creative nature.
There is little doubt that viewers believe photographs to be
more accurate depictions of the world than handmade images such
as paintings. This is clearly reflected in the courtroom where a photograph of a crime scene carries greater weight than a police
sketcher’s rendering of the same scene. In fact, most photographs
do have an epistemic advantage over most handmade images. But is
it the case that photographs are always more truthful—more factual—than handmade images, and thereby inherently less creative?
The answer is no.241
The fact that, as a result of the technology’s mechanical nature,
we always see some real world object through the photograph (the
attribute that Dominic Lopes describes as a photograph’s “transparency”)242 does not equate to the assertion that every photograph is factually accurate. Lopes explains:
Nor should the claim that photographs are transparent be confused with a claim about their accuracy.
A photograph is necessarily accurate in the sense
that it carries information by means of a causal
process. In another sense, a photograph is inaccurate, since it may cause or dispose one to have false
beliefs about the objects photographed. A colour
photograph of a red apple carries information about
the apple’s redness, though it may carry the information by having a colour indistinguishable from
that of an orange seen in ordinary light, with the re240

Costello & Phillips, supra note 46, at 2.
Philosopher Barbara Savedoff explains:
In truth, photographs can be far from objective in how they present a subject; the
photographer’s choice of camera angle, lighting, and framing all influence the way in
which the subject will be seen. Furthermore, the characteristics of the medium itself—its
two-dimensionality, the delimitation of its image, the use of black and white—all
contribute to a divergence between what we see in a photograph and what we would have
seen in person. Nevertheless, our awareness of all these factors does not change the way
we see photographs—as having a special connection to reality.
BARBARA SAVEDOFF, TRANSFORMING IMAGES 87 (2000).
242
Lopes, supra note 188, at 438. (“To say that photographs are transparent is to say
that we see through them.”).
241
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sult that we are liable to believe falsely that the apple
is orange in colour.243
Other ways in which a photograph may inaccurately depict an
object or scene include: the photographer may choose to use a fisheye or wide-angle lens that distorts the image; the photographer
may choose to use a colored filter that distorts the actual color of
the image’s subject matter; the photographer may choose to use
dramatic lighting to illuminate the subject matter, creating shadows
or bright areas that distort appearances; the photographer may
choose to take the photograph from an unusual angle that makes it
difficult to gain accurate information about the image’s subject
matter; the photograph may be taken from an airplane, providing
little information to the viewer about the subject matter; the photograph may be taken during a snowstorm, obscuring and distorting
much of the subject matter’s detail. Any of these choices by the
photographer decreases the facticity of the photograph—the truthfulness of the information conveyed to a viewer about the content
of the image.244
In sum, though photographs are generally a more reliable
source of accurate information about the world than other graphic
images, this is not always or inevitably the case. In other words,
there is no necessary connection between photography and truth.
On occasion, a photograph is not a fact in the sense that Hughes
suggests. It can lead a viewer to create false beliefs about the world.
In contrast, some handmade images can lead a viewer to develop
more truthful beliefs than a photograph of the same subject matter.
Examples include drawings of birds by John James Audubon245 or
243

Id. at 440.
Once one moves beyond pre-shutter choices to post-shutter manipulation—either in
the darkroom or on a computer—the seeming inevitable accuracy of the photograph is
cast into further doubt. Were the photographer to use the wrong mix of chemicals in the
dark room, to crop the image in a strange way, or to Photoshop the image, obviously the
facticity of the photograph would be severely compromised. Scott Walden recounts the
case of a Los Angeles Times photojournalist who was summarily fired after admitting to
digitally combining two images into a single photograph for the front page of the
newspaper. Scott Walden, Truth in Photography, in PHOTOGRAPHY AND PHILOSOPHY:
ESSAYS ON THE PENCIL OF NATURE 91 (Scott Walden ed., 2008).
245
John James Audubon (1785–1851) was a preeminent wildlife artist for much of the
early nineteenth century. Born in Saint Domingue (now Haiti), he was sent to the United
States at eighteen, settling in Pennsylvania, where he hunted, studied, and drew birds.
244
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paintings of elevated highways in New York City by photorealist
painter Rackstraw Downes.246 In both instances, because of the distorting effect of shadow, lighting, etc., few photographs capture the
exactitude of detail that appears in such handmade images.
Few would claim that a photorealist painting by Downes is unoriginal because it is an uncreative “fact.” A photograph of the
same subject matter is no more a fact than the painting. Both are
depictions. As such, if either is original it is because of the artist’s
creative choices and actions in placing design markings on the picture’s surface—not because the depiction is or is not a fact.
3. Point-and-Shoot Photographs of Real World Objects
Can Possess Unique Aesthetic Interest Worthy of
Copyright Protection
Echoing arguments of art theorist Roger Scruton,247 Justin
Hughes argues that a photograph that merely portrays an “independent reality” has no aesthetic value worthy of copyright protection. The function of such an image is purely “naïve or descriptive”248 and therefore there is “an insufficient ‘trace of the personal vision of whoever is behind the camera’ for us to grant copyright
under the standards in United States and European copyright
law.”249
This argument assumes that seeing a real world object in a photograph offers no aesthetic value above and beyond seeing that
same object face-to-face. The “naïve or descriptive” photograph is

John James Audubon, NAT’L AUDUBON SOC’Y, http://www.audubon.org/content/johnjames-audubon (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
246
Rackstraw Downes (born 1939) is a British-born realist painter and author. His oil
paintings, depicting industry and the environment, are notable for meticulous detail
accumulated during months of en plein air sessions and elongated compositions with
complex perspective. Biographical Summary—Rackstraw Downes, CROWN POINT PRESS,
http://www.crownpoint.com/artists/rackstraw-downes/biographical-summary
(last
visited Feb. 22, 2015).
247
Scruton, supra note 229 and accompanying text.
248
Hughes, supra note 15, at 381 (“[I]t seems that the claim that many—perhaps
most—of the world’s photographs are completely unprotected by copyright arises simply
because ‘[i]n most uses of the camera, the photograph’s naïve or descriptive function is
paramount.’” (quoting SONTAG, supra note 19, at 132–33)).
249
Id.
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purely documentary and offers no aesthetic interest independent of
an aesthetic interest in the object documented.
This argument is based on a flawed assumption. As Dominic
Lopes notes, “[s]eeing an object through a photograph is not identical to seeing it face-to-face.”250 In fact, seeing an object through a
photograph may “arouse an interest not satisfied by seeing the
same object face-to-face.”251 What is the unique aesthetic interest
that can be aroused by seeing an object through a photograph that
is above and beyond seeing the object face-to-face?
Lopes suggests five factors related to seeing an object through a
photograph that potentially contribute aesthetic value over and
above seeing that same object face-to-face:
1. “[P]hotographs capture their objects fixed at a moment in
time. . . . Rudolf Arnheim writes that in photographs ‘the
rapid course of events is found to contain hidden moments
which, when isolated and fixed, reveal new and different
meanings.’”252
2. Because the actual object seen in the photograph is generally
absent when viewing the image, “photographic seeing
through bridges distances, either spatial or temporal.… Obviously, nostalgia for an object cannot be evoked by seeing it
face-to-face.”253
3. Seeing through a photograph “isolates the photographed object from the context it would normally be seen to inhabit.
With change of context comes a change in the properties
the object itself may be seen to have. . . . Seeing through decontextualizes.”254
4. “[T]he presence of a camera is an essential part of the context in which we see an object photographically—what we
see through a photograph is always before a camera. Moreover, the camera sometimes intrudes upon or disturbs what
250

Lopes, supra note 188, at 441.
Id. at 442.
252
Id. at 442–43. (quoting Rudolf Arnheim, Splendor and Misery of the Photographer, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ART 118 (1986)).
253
Id. at 443.
254
Id.
251
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it photographs, especially when it is a person, thereby
showing it in a way inaccessible to the naked eye.”255
5. “[S]eeing photographs is typically twofold in the sense that
it melds seeing the photographed object and its properties
with seeing the photograph itself and its properties.… Photographic seeing through is always simultaneous with plain
vanilla seeing of a photograph.”256
He concludes:
An aesthetic interest in a photograph is properly an
interest in the photograph itself, not in some other
object. Since photographs are transparent, an interest in a photograph as a photograph is an interest in
it as a vehicle for seeing through it to the photographed scene. This is not an interest limited to the
scene itself; it is an interest in the scene as it is seen
through the photograph. Thus our aesthetic interest
in a photograph . . . is an interest in the photograph
as it enables seeing through. It is an interest that
photographs can foster and satisfy and face-to face
seeing cannot.257
For Hughes, ordinary point-and-shoot photographs are aesthetically empty vessels useful only for carrying information about objects in the world. By suggesting that there is unique aesthetic value
to be gained from viewing a real world object through a photograph, value unavailable from simply viewing that object face-toface, Lopes’s arguments go a long way toward undermining
Hughes’s argument.
Of course, given Bleistein’s admonition against courts making
aesthetic judgments,258 Lopes’s suggestion that unique aesthetic
value can be derived from viewing objects through photographs is
255

Id.
Lopes suggests that these five features of seeing an object through a photograph lend
themselves to supporting what he calls “documentary aesthetics”: “What may be called a
documentary aesthetics has two dimensions. One measures the authenticity, accuracy or
truthfulness of a photograph; the other measures its promotion of revelatory,
transformative or defamilarizing seeing.” Id. at 445
257
Id.
258
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
256
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entirely beside the point when it comes to determining copyright
originality. Under current doctrine, such determinations are
founded only in the photographer’s pre-shutter choices and actions.259 Given current copyright law’s utter lack of criteria for assessing the aesthetic value of a photograph, this Article seconds the
current approach.260
Nonetheless, for those (like Hughes) who believe that the bar
for copyright originality should be raised,261 Lopes’s analysis offers
an intriguing glimpse into how this might be accomplished. To begin with, were the law to base determinations of originality on aesthetic quality,262 criteria for such determinations would necessarily
be unique to each genre of artwork. What makes a photograph aesthetically valuable is fundamentally different from what makes a
painting aesthetically valuable, and such differences would have to
be integrated into a new doctrine of originality
As an example of how Lopes’s factors might aid in assessing a
photograph’s originality, consider Thomas Mangelsen’s wellknown photograph, Catch of the Day, which depicts a salmon jumping into the mouth of a brown bear in Katmai National Park,
Alaska. In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.,263 Judge Lewis Kaplan
suggests that this photograph is original by virtue of timing: “[A]
person may create a worthwhile photograph by being at the right
place at the right time.”264 In so doing, he bases originality on the
photographer’s choices and actions, not on aesthetic attributes of
the photograph.
259

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See Subotnik, supra note 15, at 1490 (“[A] definitive account of originality as a legal
construct is not possible and that, as a result, the current low threshold for originality
should be maintained. Under this analysis, most photographs, so long as they comply with
certain requirements, should be granted protection, at the very least, against exact
copying (for example, through digital copying and pasting).”).
261
See also Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 457–58 (2009)
(arguing in favor of heightening the creativity requirement for copyright protection).
262
See Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805 (2005) (arguing that,
despite Bleistein’s admonition, aesthetic judgments regularly enter into legal
decisionmaking); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Theory and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
247 (1998) (arguing that “judges should be conscious of aesthetics when deciding
copyright cases”).
263
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (2005).
264
Id. (quoting 1 LADDIE, supra note 154, § 4.57, p. 229).
260
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Lopes’s list of factors offers one possible approach for recognizing the attributes of Mangelsen’s photograph that make it aesthetically interesting. In accord with Lopes’s first factor, by isolating a fixed moment in time, the photograph reveals “new and different meanings” that a viewer watching the live event would inevitably miss—that very moment the fish enters the mouth of a
bear. Similarly, along the lines of Lopes’s third factor, the photograph decontextualizes the bear, the fish, and the water from their
normal movements in time and space and, in so doing, presents an
other-worldly frozen image divorced from any imaginable daily experience.
But, alas, we live in a post-Bleistein world. Hughes’s and the
Mannion court’s protestations to the contrary notwithstanding,265
modern courts continue to make determinations of photographic
originality based solely on choices and actions of the photographer,
not on aesthetic attributes of the photograph. Nonetheless, introducing Lopes’s factors related to identifying such attributes points
to an important lesson. Were copyright law to abandon Bleistein’s
admonition against aesthetic judgments, determinations of photographic originality would not turn on whether an image is a “fact”
or portrays an “independent reality.” Rather, such determinations
would look to attributes that make particular photographs worthy
of aesthetic contemplation. Included within such original images
would be point-and-shoot photographs of real world objects as well
as photographs of constructed tableaus. The facticity of an image
would be irrelevant to a new jurisprudence of photographic originality.
4. Photographic Accuracy Is a Creative Choice
Professor Hughes further challenges photographic originality
because most photographs portray only an “accurate representation of [an] independent reality.”266 He is not alone in this challenge,267 which is grounded in the following assumption: Taking
265

See supra note 184.
Hughes, supra note 15, at 374.
267
Professor Daniel Gervais similarly argues that “a photographer trying to take a
technically perfect picture is not making creative choices.” Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes
Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 956 (2002).
266
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accurate photographs of real world objects is simply what cameras
do by default—there is “no room for creative choices.”268 As such,
the act of pointing and shooting a camera is devoid of even the minimal creativity required for copyright originality. It is only when a
photographer actively poses a scene or chooses to move away from
mere accuracy through creative camera adjustments or choice of
perspective that a photograph enters the realm of originality.269
I want to step back into history to challenge the assumption
that photographic accuracy is inherently devoid of minimal creativity. Beginning in the late nineteenth century until the 1920s, a photographic movement known as “Pictorialism” became popular
among professional and amateur photographers alike, a movement
that encouraged the “moving away from faithful depiction toward
more evocative and expressive photographs.”270 In part a reaction
against what was viewed as vulgar commercial photography,
Pictorialist photographers favored scenes infused
with fog and shadows. In contrast to their simple
subjects, they strove for tonal complexity, choosing
techniques such as platinum printing, which yielded
abundant soft, middle-gray tones.…Their results
were in obvious visual opposition to the sharp blackand-white contrasts of the commercial print. Pictorialist photographs were frequently printed on textured paper, unlike the glossy surface of commercial
photographs .…271

268

Id. at 978.
Professors Hughes and Gervais both base their skepticism of the originality of
accurate photography on the court’s decision in Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel, 25 F.
Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Judge Kaplan noted,
[O]ne need not deny the creativity inherent in the art of photography
to recognize that a photograph which is no more than a copy of the
work of another as exact as science and technology permit lacks
originality. That is not to say such a feat is trivial, simply not original.
Id. See Gervais, supra note 267, at 979–80; Hughes, supra note 15, at 374–75. I have
challenged the reasoning of Bridgeman in another article. See Kogan, supra note 194, at
471.
270
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at 170 (setting forth the history of
Pictorialism).
271
Id.
269
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Responding to the perceived automatism of the camera, “[o]ne
Pictorialist asserted that ‘the photographer is not helpless before
the mechanical means at his disposal. He can master them as he
may choose, and he can make the lens see with his eyes, can make
the plate receive his impressions.’”272 In light of broad interest in
Pictorialism, “[c]ommerical producers rushed to make soft-focus
lenses and textured photographic papers for amateur use.”273
Given the popularity of Pictorialism at the turn of the twentieth
century, a photographer wishing to purchase a camera would have
to choose whether to purchase one with a non-distortive, accurate
lens or one with a soft-focus lens. I suggest that either decision
would properly be described as a creative choice, one that would
significantly impact the appearance of the resulting images.
Little has changed today. A photographer’s decision as to the
type of image to create—accurate and non-distorted, or artsy—
begins at the moment a photographer purchases a camera and one
or more lenses. Though most photographers purchase conventional lenses that produce accurate photographs, some purchase fisheye, wide-angle or other lenses that in some way distort the accuracy of the depiction. To argue that a photographer’s choice to use a
distortive lens satisfies Feist’s minimal creativity standard,274 while
the choice to use a non-distortive, conventional lens does not,
seems entirely arbitrary. Rather, a photographer’s opting for one
type of lens rather than another directly impacts how design markings will be laid down on the surface of the image, the issue most
relevant to copyright originality. Choosing to shoot an accurate
photograph is as much a choice of photographic style as choosing
to shoot a distorted picture.275

272

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 171.
274
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (explaining that
the “minimal degree of creativity” standard is “extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice”).
275
See MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at xiv (“Because photography was
thought not to have an inherent style of its own, it quickly became synonymous with the
making and collecting of objective images. Yet it is important to remember that the
absence of style—stylessness—is a style in its own right. When it appears, it points to the
expectations of the photographer and of the image’s anticipated audiences.”).
273

934

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:869

Imagine the following: An amateur photographer, having studied Pictorialist photography in an art history class, decides to take
photographs of Buckingham Palace on a foggy night. She begins by
shooting a very out-of-focus image of the building. She then takes a
series of photographs in which she slowly brings the building into
focus. In the last photograph of the series, the building is in sharp
focus and a viewer can readily detect minute details of the structure. Is the final photograph, “an accurate representation of [an]
independent reality,”276 entitled to less copyright protection than
the out-of-focus photographs? Why is that photograph any less the
result of the photographer’s creative decision-making than the earlier images?
Perhaps at the end of the day, the brunt of Hughes’s attack is
being leveled at the vast majority of today’s photographs taken using autofocus point-and-shoot cameras. In such cases, a photographer’s opportunities to manipulate the camera are greatly restricted and, accordingly, it could be argued that such images slip
beneath Feist’s threshold of minimal creativity. In fact, the photographer behind a point-and-shoot camera does make certain, albeit
limited, creative choices. To begin with, she chooses to express
herself using a camera rather than, say, a paintbrush. 277 Moreover,
she chooses a point-and-shoot camera knowing that it will take accurate, rather than distorted, images. Having done so, she then
chooses an object or scene at which to point the camera, and then
chooses the moment at which to depress the shutter button. Why is
a point-and-shoot photographer any less creative than, say, an untrained weekend painter who attempts to paint landscapes?
Assuming that courts continue to obey Bleistein’s admonition
against evaluating aesthetic quality, raising the bar for photographic
originality would require that courts identify which pre-shutter
choices and actions are, alone or in combination, creative enough
to satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity requirement. In all likelihood
there would be unanimous agreement that a photographer’s acts of
276

Hughes, supra note 15, at 374.
Hughes dismisses amateur photographers as inherently less creative than amateurs
engaging in other arts: “Photography . . . allows people untalented in drawing or painting
to create visual images they might otherwise imagine but be unable to create.” Hughes,
supra note 15, at 368.
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posing and staging the tableau carry the image over that threshold.
But how should courts judge the relevance to originality of the following camera-related choices by a photographer?


Choosing a distorting fish-eye lens to
achieve a special effect;
 Adjusting a telephoto lens to make the
subject matter appear closer;
 Adjusting a conventional lens to take an outof-focus picture;
 Adjusting a conventional lens to take an infocus picture;
 Using a pink filter over the lens;
 Adjusting the camera’s exposure setting to
take an over-exposed shot;
 Waiting for a dog to walk in front of the
camera’s field of vision before clicking the
shutter button;
 Choosing to point the camera at one statue
rather than another; or
 Choosing an unconventional angle from
which to shoot a photograph.
I obviously could go on and on. The point is that trying to identify which pre-shutter choices and actions are or are not creative
enough to satisfy Feist’s minimal creativity requirement would be
an exercise in arbitrariness.
Perhaps we should focus, instead, on the mental profile of a
photographer rather than her pre-shutter actions. Hughes suggests
that copyright protection might be extended to photographs that
merely capture a “preexisting reality” if they are the result of a
photographer’s “intentional program”278 involving a photograph278

Hughes, supra note 15, at 416 (“If we eliminate human agency from the preexisting
subject of the photograph so that we now have a photograph of something that is natural
or random, then we may find another important distinction between photographs that
capture slices of reality as part of an ‘intentional program’ and photographs that are not
part of an intentional program. By intentional program, I mean the expeditions of Ansel
Adams, the nighttime excursions of Brassai, every time Mannie Garcia goes out on
assignment, and every occasion when a photographer wanders around a city in search of
interesting imagery.”).
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er’s exerting a “deliberate effort to be creative.”279 But how is a
court to determine whether a photographer had the appropriate
mindset to deem her resulting image copyright protectable? Many
an amateur photographer on vacation lifts her camera with a clear
intention to shoot a beautiful and novel photograph of Niagara
Falls—and, on occasion, some succeed. As Mary Warner Marien
observes, “aesthetic experimentation and self-expression are not
limited to art photography, but encompass all genres, including
amateur and casual photography, as evidenced on the flourishing
Internet-based camera-phone galleries.”280 Looking to a photographer’s intentions to ground the originality of un-staged photographs is also an exercise in arbitrariness.
In the end, for lack of workable and non-arbitrary standards,
photographic copyrightability should remain open to all photographs taken by a camera behind which is a warm body that can infuse a modicum of personality into the resulting image.281
CONCLUSION
From the moment that the Supreme Court first considered
whether photographs merit copyright protection in 1884, the camera’s automatism and the image’s verisimilitude—the enigmatic
features of photography—have placed roadblocks in the way of understanding how a photograph can be considered a creative artwork. Looking to these two features of the technology, contemporary legal skeptics claim that most photographs are undeserving of
copyright protection because they inevitably capture uncreative
facts—in Professor Hughes’s words, “the automated representation of reality.”282

279

Id. at 400–01.
MARIEN, PHOTOGRAPHY, supra note 2, at xv.
281
I agree with Professor Hughes that photographs taken by surveillance cameras,
satellite systems, New York taxicab cameras, and similar devices undirected by a human
personality should not be protected by copyright law. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 15, at
380. I also agree that photographs accidently taken by a monkey are probably not
protected by copyright law. Id. at 373–74.
282
Hughes, supra note 15, at 343.
280
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This Article proposes that understanding a photograph as a depiction with two folds283 can shed considerable light on the copyrightability of such images and go a long way toward defusing the
enigma of photography as it impacts the law. A photograph’s originality inheres primarily in a photographer’s choices and actions
that result in the placement of surface design markings, the first
fold of depiction. In contrast, the object that a viewer perceives in
the image, depiction’s second fold, rarely impacts originality.
Accordingly, the claim of legal skeptics that most photographs
are uncreative facts locates photographic originality in the wrong
place—in what a viewer sees in the image, depiction’s second fold.
If, instead, originality is understood as based primarily on the photographer’s creative choices and actions in placing surface design
markings (depiction’s first fold), the attack on a photograph’s originality based on its inevitably being an uncreative fact collapses.
This Article also argues that, because it lacks workable criteria for
judging the aesthetic value of photographs, copyright law should
continue to view expansively and generously the range of a photographer’s creative choices and actions that can ground photographic originality.

283

See generally WOLLHEIM, supra note 26, at 213–14.

